As on 9th of July, some section of the society in Assam have declared a war against the outsiders ( here it is mentioned as Bangladesh nationals ). Brahmin S. Bhattacharya along with his army of anti Muslims ideologist from AASU Sankar Prasad Rai and Tapan Kumar Gogoi have intensified the oust outsiders campaigned since than. The scenario remembers one of the 1977 problems in Assam. I want to mention two very important term – Xenophobic and Islam phobic, Xenophobia means fear of strangers and Islam phobic means fear of Muslim.
Than within after a short span of time a Brahmin Justice BK Sarmah of the Gauhati High Court have said that Bangladeshis have become ‘‘kingmakers’’ in Assam.
The organizations behind this oust outsiders campaigned – are mainly led by the AASU, AGP, BJP, VHP, RSS along with more organizations i.e. ,Axom Jatiyatabadi Yava chatra Parishad (AJYCP), All Assam Muttock Yuva Chatra Sanmilan (AAMYCS), All Moran Students’ Union, Mottock Yuba Chatra Parishad (MYCP) ATTSA, TMPK, Tai Ahom Yuva Parishad, Assam Chah Mazdoor Sangha (ACMS), Nikhil Bodo Students’ Union, ATASU, AASA, ASIO, ATTSA, AGP, Marwari Yuva Manch, Bengali Yuva Chatra Federation, Karmachari Parishad, All Assam Tribal Sangha, Sikh Samaj and Gurkha Students Union. Bengali Yuva Chatra Parishad, the Bangla Bhasi Asomiya Xantha, Banglabhasi Asomiya Samaj, Bhojpuri Students’ Union, Marwari Yuva Parishad, Purbottar Pradeshiya Marwari Sanmelan etc
On the other hand there are organization which are more or less on defensive mood i.e. Muslim Yuba Parishad, Asom (MYPA), AUDF, All Assam Minorities Students Union AAMSU ( 2 groups ) , All Assam Muslim Council, All Assam Khilanjiya Asomiya Musalman Parishad (AAKAMP), Asom Garia-Maria Jatiya Parishad, All Assam Muslim Yuba Parishad (AAMYP), Muslim Students Union Assam, All Assam Madrassa Students Association (AAMSA), Sadou Asom Khilonjia Asomiya Musalman Unnayan Parishad, Asomiya Muslim Unnayan Parishad, Gana Jagaran on Jamaat I Islami etc.
During these time one can hear names of some organization which were never heard before. Some of these organization which do not have a proper address or are managed by one or two persons.
On Aug 9 Anjali Daimari, the advisor to Indigenous Women’s Forum of North East India (Assam Committee) said “The influx of illegal migrants from Bangladesh poses a grave threat to the indigenous or tribal population of Assam, which actually undermines their cultural and economic identity. However, inflow of non-indigenous people from within the country too could play an equally negative role in damaging the cultural, linguistic and material basis of the indigenous communities” and also said that “the first settlers of a land who have historical continuity in the land can only be termed as indigenous people of that land. Accordingly the Adivasis coming from outside Asom and settling here cannot be termed as sons of the soil ”
Mohammad Sadullah was the First Premier of Assam. Than Assam was much more bigger in area than is present time Assam. Assam was than a Muslim majority region, reason for which Muslim League came to power with Sadullah as the Premier. But with the Cunning Brahmin Gopinath Bordoloi – taking the lead from Congress, Assam became divided and many more small states came into being with his dirty politics. The results of the 1977 –85 problems led the Brahmin P. K. Mahanta to power. P. K. Mahanta came to power twice and ruled 10 long years. Except these two Brahmin ( G. Bordoloi and P. K. Mahanta ), no Brahmin could not come to power with Assam’s long history of existence. But now some Brahmin’s wanted to come to the power corridor of Assam through their nefarious tactics, famous of them are S. Bhattacharya, P. K. Mahanta, Dinesh Goswamy, and Hemanta Biswa Sarma.
End of part 1
Afdal Hussain
Sunday, August 24, 2008
Wednesday, July 30, 2008
Why internal problems of J&K were not resolved
By Balraj Puri
ccun.org, July 27, 2008
There hardly seems to be any way the Jammu and Kashmir government can pacify the current angry mood in Jammu over revocation of the government order for the transfer of forest land to the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB). For any such step is likely to revive the flare up in Kashmir from which it just recovered. On the other hand the leaders of the current agitation who are riding on a spontaneous popular upsurge can ill afford to back out.
What then are the options for the leaders of the Jammu agitation which have declared to continue till the order is withdrawn? On the sixth day of the bandh, BJP national President and General Secretary Rajnath Singh and Arun Jaitley, came to Jammu to lend its support. The BJP and its Parivar organized a nation-wide Bandh on July 3 for the same cause; though with partial success. The party president proposed to raise the issue from 'Sansad to Sadak' (Parliament to Streets) and make it a poll issue.There is no doubt that Jammu had accumulated a lot of grievances over the years. The issue merely provided an outlet for the pent up anger. But the leadership of the agitation must ensure that investment of so much energy over the current agitation should address itself to larger grievances also.For that let us try to learn lessons from the earlier experiences and role of leaders of Jammu and where did they go wrong.
The first wrong decision they tool in recent times was, for instance, to support the Maharaja's desire for an independent state and thus delay its accession to India till Pakistan sponsored raid on Kashmir left no choice for the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah to accede to Indian Union and seek help of the Indian army to defend the state. The Sheikh did receive hero's welcome when he came to Jammu as the Head of the Emergency Administration. After initial goodwill for Sheikh Abdullah, disillusionment with him started growing in Jammu as he did not have any political base here and did not know how to share power with its peoples. He ran the administration though the National Conference leaders as its officers, for instance.
About a year later, I warned Prime Minister Nehru of the consequences of the simmering discontent in Jammu. His reply was that while a Kashmiri leader would be the head of the Government, Jammu's Maharaja would be the head of the state. This should satisfy both the regions. I argued that the arrangement was unjust to Jammu. For while political power will remain with Kashmiri leaders, people of Jammu would merely have an illusion that their man was living in the palace, who is a constitutional head would be without any power and would be inaccessible. Nehru told me "let us give this unstable stability a trial."
Trial did not work too long. The Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah were not even on speaking terms. By June 1949, the Maharaja had to abdicate in favor of his son Karan Singh. There was again a movement for the "return of the Maharaja." It did not occur to the leaders of Jammu that the age of Rajas and Maharajas was over.
After a prolonged campaign, I was able to persuade Nehru and Abdullah to declare on 24 July 1952 at a joint press conference that "the constitution of the state, when framed would provide for regional autonomy." This would have provided a lasting solution of relations between Kashmir and Jammu regions, and to the Kashmir problem.
But the Praja Parishad, Jammu affiliate of the Bhartiya Jana Sangh, started an agitation on Delhi agreement on Centre-State relations, supplemented by the State-Region relations. Dr.Shyama Prasad Mukerjee the founder president of the Jana Sangh came to lend support of his party to it. He was kept in detention at Chashma Shahi house in Srinagar. During a prolonged correspondence with Nehru, he offered to support in his letter dated 17th February 1953, Delhi agreement and Article 370 provided regional autonomy was also granted. Nehru replied that this was granted in July 1952 and if he had realized his mistake , he should withdraw the movement. Mukerjee wanted some face saving device. Unfortunately his untimely death in June 1953 before the final agreement between death in June 1953 before the final agreement between his party and Nehru could be announced.
Meanwhile the state government sent a 45 page draft on regional autonomy to Durga Das Verma , the underground leader of the Parishad agitation. After consulting some constitutional experts , he returned the draft with his party's approval. Eventually the agitation was withdrawn after Nehru's assurance on regional autonomy to the Praja Parishad leaders , who after their release, went to Delhi to meet him on 3 July, 1953.
But according to Balraj Madhok , subsequent of the Jana Sangh , the party reversed this decision after some months on the direction of the RSS. To reverse the decision taken by Shyama Prasad and the Jammu Praja Parishad on a directive from the RSS was the biggest blunder that a party committed to the cause of Jammu. Thus Jammu missed an opportunity of getting a status of equality with Kashmir. Jammu missed another opportunity of acquiring such a status when Gajendragadhar Commission, in its report in 1967 on the basis of a representation of the Jammu autonomy Forum, headed by me, conceded in its report in 1967 that regional autonomy autonomy would be an ideal solution of regional grievances but it did not recommend it as the idea was opposed by most of its leaders. The national executive of the Bhartiya Jana Sangh which met at Shimla in the same year dubbed the idea of regional autonomy as anti-national. Despite its opposition the idea continued to gain popular support from all communities of Jammu region, particularly Muslim majority districts of Rajouri, Poonch and Doda as also most of the secular parties of India.
The J&K State People's Convention , convened by Sheikh Abdullah in 1968 , representing the entire political spectrum of the valley, adopted internal constitution of the state drafted by me which provided for regional autonomy and further evolution of power to districts, blocks and Panchayats. In early seventies when Indira-Abdullah talks were going on , Indira asked me to get Abdullah's commitment to regional autonomy. He reiterated before power was transferred to him; so that there was no opposition from Jammu and Ladakh to him. Abdullah agreed to call a convention of leaders of Jammu and Ladakh in 1974 where he reiterated his commitment. In 1996 when the National Conference government appointed a regional autonomy committee , headed by me, the BJP was the only party which boycotted it. Its opposition was used as an excuse by the government to reject my report. Regional identities are the greatest secularizing forces in the state. Any weakening of them might lead to divide the state on religious lines which is not in the interest of Jammu, Kashmir or the nation. There was a time when the BJP party and the government headed by it at the Centre had proposed for such a division. I argued with Advani, who was the deputy Prime Minister in that government of the dangerous consequences of the move. Eventually he agreed with my arguments and told me I am convinced that the remedy is worse than the disease. Then I argued in favour of regional autonomy as a solution to the Jammu problem. He was convinced of that also and asked me to revive that idea. The government law minister also declared that parliament had no power to abrogate article 370, which, in any case, had nothing to do with the Jammu problem. Meanwhile all Left parties and the socialist groups supported the idea of the regional autonomy. I wanted it to be included in the Common Minimum programme of the Congress and the People Democratic Party agreed upon after 2002 election before forming a coalition government. But Manmohan Singh told me that the Jammu Congress were not keen it to be included in it.
Recently National Conference passed a resolution in its favour. It could be a basis of a dialogue with all Kashmir centric parties. For if as per PPP leader Asif Zardari Indo-Pak relations cannot be held hostage to Kashmir problem, the leaders of Kashmir based parties should also realize that regional harmony should not be held hostage to what they call final solution of the Kashmir problem. Thus the national course that the Jammu agitation should adopt is to convert it into regional autonomy ; so that popular energy spent on it yields optimum results.
ccun.org, July 27, 2008
There hardly seems to be any way the Jammu and Kashmir government can pacify the current angry mood in Jammu over revocation of the government order for the transfer of forest land to the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB). For any such step is likely to revive the flare up in Kashmir from which it just recovered. On the other hand the leaders of the current agitation who are riding on a spontaneous popular upsurge can ill afford to back out.
What then are the options for the leaders of the Jammu agitation which have declared to continue till the order is withdrawn? On the sixth day of the bandh, BJP national President and General Secretary Rajnath Singh and Arun Jaitley, came to Jammu to lend its support. The BJP and its Parivar organized a nation-wide Bandh on July 3 for the same cause; though with partial success. The party president proposed to raise the issue from 'Sansad to Sadak' (Parliament to Streets) and make it a poll issue.There is no doubt that Jammu had accumulated a lot of grievances over the years. The issue merely provided an outlet for the pent up anger. But the leadership of the agitation must ensure that investment of so much energy over the current agitation should address itself to larger grievances also.For that let us try to learn lessons from the earlier experiences and role of leaders of Jammu and where did they go wrong.
The first wrong decision they tool in recent times was, for instance, to support the Maharaja's desire for an independent state and thus delay its accession to India till Pakistan sponsored raid on Kashmir left no choice for the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah to accede to Indian Union and seek help of the Indian army to defend the state. The Sheikh did receive hero's welcome when he came to Jammu as the Head of the Emergency Administration. After initial goodwill for Sheikh Abdullah, disillusionment with him started growing in Jammu as he did not have any political base here and did not know how to share power with its peoples. He ran the administration though the National Conference leaders as its officers, for instance.
About a year later, I warned Prime Minister Nehru of the consequences of the simmering discontent in Jammu. His reply was that while a Kashmiri leader would be the head of the Government, Jammu's Maharaja would be the head of the state. This should satisfy both the regions. I argued that the arrangement was unjust to Jammu. For while political power will remain with Kashmiri leaders, people of Jammu would merely have an illusion that their man was living in the palace, who is a constitutional head would be without any power and would be inaccessible. Nehru told me "let us give this unstable stability a trial."
Trial did not work too long. The Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah were not even on speaking terms. By June 1949, the Maharaja had to abdicate in favor of his son Karan Singh. There was again a movement for the "return of the Maharaja." It did not occur to the leaders of Jammu that the age of Rajas and Maharajas was over.
After a prolonged campaign, I was able to persuade Nehru and Abdullah to declare on 24 July 1952 at a joint press conference that "the constitution of the state, when framed would provide for regional autonomy." This would have provided a lasting solution of relations between Kashmir and Jammu regions, and to the Kashmir problem.
But the Praja Parishad, Jammu affiliate of the Bhartiya Jana Sangh, started an agitation on Delhi agreement on Centre-State relations, supplemented by the State-Region relations. Dr.Shyama Prasad Mukerjee the founder president of the Jana Sangh came to lend support of his party to it. He was kept in detention at Chashma Shahi house in Srinagar. During a prolonged correspondence with Nehru, he offered to support in his letter dated 17th February 1953, Delhi agreement and Article 370 provided regional autonomy was also granted. Nehru replied that this was granted in July 1952 and if he had realized his mistake , he should withdraw the movement. Mukerjee wanted some face saving device. Unfortunately his untimely death in June 1953 before the final agreement between death in June 1953 before the final agreement between his party and Nehru could be announced.
Meanwhile the state government sent a 45 page draft on regional autonomy to Durga Das Verma , the underground leader of the Parishad agitation. After consulting some constitutional experts , he returned the draft with his party's approval. Eventually the agitation was withdrawn after Nehru's assurance on regional autonomy to the Praja Parishad leaders , who after their release, went to Delhi to meet him on 3 July, 1953.
But according to Balraj Madhok , subsequent of the Jana Sangh , the party reversed this decision after some months on the direction of the RSS. To reverse the decision taken by Shyama Prasad and the Jammu Praja Parishad on a directive from the RSS was the biggest blunder that a party committed to the cause of Jammu. Thus Jammu missed an opportunity of getting a status of equality with Kashmir. Jammu missed another opportunity of acquiring such a status when Gajendragadhar Commission, in its report in 1967 on the basis of a representation of the Jammu autonomy Forum, headed by me, conceded in its report in 1967 that regional autonomy autonomy would be an ideal solution of regional grievances but it did not recommend it as the idea was opposed by most of its leaders. The national executive of the Bhartiya Jana Sangh which met at Shimla in the same year dubbed the idea of regional autonomy as anti-national. Despite its opposition the idea continued to gain popular support from all communities of Jammu region, particularly Muslim majority districts of Rajouri, Poonch and Doda as also most of the secular parties of India.
The J&K State People's Convention , convened by Sheikh Abdullah in 1968 , representing the entire political spectrum of the valley, adopted internal constitution of the state drafted by me which provided for regional autonomy and further evolution of power to districts, blocks and Panchayats. In early seventies when Indira-Abdullah talks were going on , Indira asked me to get Abdullah's commitment to regional autonomy. He reiterated before power was transferred to him; so that there was no opposition from Jammu and Ladakh to him. Abdullah agreed to call a convention of leaders of Jammu and Ladakh in 1974 where he reiterated his commitment. In 1996 when the National Conference government appointed a regional autonomy committee , headed by me, the BJP was the only party which boycotted it. Its opposition was used as an excuse by the government to reject my report. Regional identities are the greatest secularizing forces in the state. Any weakening of them might lead to divide the state on religious lines which is not in the interest of Jammu, Kashmir or the nation. There was a time when the BJP party and the government headed by it at the Centre had proposed for such a division. I argued with Advani, who was the deputy Prime Minister in that government of the dangerous consequences of the move. Eventually he agreed with my arguments and told me I am convinced that the remedy is worse than the disease. Then I argued in favour of regional autonomy as a solution to the Jammu problem. He was convinced of that also and asked me to revive that idea. The government law minister also declared that parliament had no power to abrogate article 370, which, in any case, had nothing to do with the Jammu problem. Meanwhile all Left parties and the socialist groups supported the idea of the regional autonomy. I wanted it to be included in the Common Minimum programme of the Congress and the People Democratic Party agreed upon after 2002 election before forming a coalition government. But Manmohan Singh told me that the Jammu Congress were not keen it to be included in it.
Recently National Conference passed a resolution in its favour. It could be a basis of a dialogue with all Kashmir centric parties. For if as per PPP leader Asif Zardari Indo-Pak relations cannot be held hostage to Kashmir problem, the leaders of Kashmir based parties should also realize that regional harmony should not be held hostage to what they call final solution of the Kashmir problem. Thus the national course that the Jammu agitation should adopt is to convert it into regional autonomy ; so that popular energy spent on it yields optimum results.
Samujjal Bhattacharya on July 09 have declare a war against the Muslims of Assam.
Samujjal Bhattacharya with his Anti Muslim organization AASU have declared vigorous and continuous agitation in Assam. The cause is too much of Muslims have given sleepless nights to him and his folk. Brahmin S Bhattacharya said that seven persons have being released from jail, this persons were arrested on the presumption of ISI agents. But the authority in Assam could not proof it and have released them. He along with his folk Sankar Prasad Rai and Tapan Kumar Gogoi have said that the war will start with the sound and instruments. The scenario reminds of the hindu fanatic pogrom of Gujarat 02. One should know that Brahmin have entered Assam / N.E. during the last 400 years. So Brahmin S Bhattacharya should know that – What right do he have to talk on behalf of indigenous communities ??? Sankar Prasad Rai is from the Rajbonshi community – which it self does not have a long history in Assam / N.E. The Ahoms who came to Assam were part of Shan tribes from which the word Assam has come. They were not influenced by the Brahmin religion before they came to Assam but sometime after the 14th century the Ahom Kings came under increasing Brahmin religious influence and like this the Brahmin conjured up a new kashatriya lineage for them. And in this way Ahom became followers of Brahmin religion and in modern time ended up with the lower stage of the Brahmin caste system. Though majority of the Ahoms follow the Brahmin religion but still they follow their Tai culture and tradition. So, it will be better for Brahmin S Bhattacharya and his illegal anti Muslim organization AASU to take some lesson from history and not to full the masses of Assam / N.E.
Thursday, August 09, 2007
EPAAR OPAAR
http://thedailystar.net/forum/2007/august/epaar.htm
Udayan Chattopadhyay reflects on the border divide
An accident of history placed my mother's ancestral village right next to the border, though on the "right" side as far as we were concerned. No one from our immediate family lives there anymore, and I had never visited it; on a whim, during one of my annual trips to India, we decide to drive out there mainly to see the famous mandir which our family has been involved with over several generations, and which is a major place of local pilgrimage.
We can see the border very clearly from the temple roof. A disciplined line (by Bengali standards) waits on both sides, with papers in hand, eager to cross to the other side. Indian and Bangladeshi officers -- distinguishable by their different uniforms -- are busy processing documents, opening bags, conducting body searches, and then waving people through to their counterparts on the other side. Within clear visibility, though a distance away, is another portion of this border; here, there is utter chaos on both sides -- crowds of people, trucks, cows, goats, bullock-carts -- and the movement is more fluid and erratic; officers from either the Indian or Bangladeshi side are nowhere to be seen. "That line isn't for people like us," one of the temple staff assures me as he notices my fascination. "There they just come and go as they please, they don't need papers like we do."
As we go around the temple, the purohit explains that during the big festivals the bulk of the visitors are, in fact, from Bangladesh. During Durga Puja, they construct huge tents outside the premises; Indian visitors are primarily local or day-trippers, but Bangladeshis usually stop overnight on their way to Calcutta and beyond.
"Are they Hindus only?" I ask. "No, both Hindus and Muslims. They all come to enjoy the festivities, though only the Hindus worship." Apparently, thousands pass through every year from o paar. "We cook special meals for the Bangladeshis -- they prefer food different from what we usually eat." "Halal?" I ask, though that seems ridiculous; the temple would never serve meat. "No" he laughs. "Those Bangals, they prefer their food to be much more jhal than we do. We will die if we eat that food all the time!" "Do the visitors from Bangladesh stop at the temple on their way back?" Everyone laughs at my naïve question. "No one goes back once they come over e paar."
They explain that it is much easier to cross during religious festivals, when border guards can be more readily convinced that the travelers are undertaking quick family visits.
At the market right outside the temple I notice that many of the publications -- mainly religious books -- are from Dhaka and Khulna rather than from Calcutta. "They are cheaper than the ones from Calcutta," explains the hawker as I fumble through the pages, more interested in how the books got to India than in the contents. A rival hawker, who perhaps does not have access to the cheaper merchandise, asserts harshly: "Those Bangladeshi books are terrible. They will fall apart within a couple of days. My books are more expensive but they are Indian and better." I chuckle with my family at what seems to be harmless banter -- until the seller of Calcutta books rebukes his neighbour: "You Bangals, you are ruining our country. Why don't you just go back to where you came from?" And he's not joking.
This exchange sends shivers down my spine. Having grown up in London as an Indian immigrant, battling bullies in the school playground, and having lived in New York through the post 9/11 hysteria, hearing "go back to where you came from" -- in any language, in any geography -- momentarily paralyses me. I do not know whether he is one of the Bangals whose family, like those of an estimated 25% of West Bengal's population (20 million people), crossed over from o paar in the decade after 1947. Or is he part of a later phenomenon -- the post-1971 Bangladeshi migrant, estimated by many in India to be between 5 and 20 million. And if the latter, is he an economic migrant (both Hindu and Muslim) or a refugee (invariably Hindu)? I have spent hours debating with my Bangladeshi friends the very existence of the phenomenon of Bangladeshi migration to India, and the nuances behind these categories, but seeing the hurt on the "Bangladeshi" man's face, I don't really care for labels at this point. This is obviously not the first time he has heard this kind of talk. It is a reminder of the rising passions across India on the issue of Bangladeshi migrants.
When in Dhaka a few months later, I find myself thinking about the same issues. A rickshaw puller identifies my accent and starts grilling me: "Are you from Calcutta? What are you doing in Dhaka?
Are you Muslim?" I have come to realise that, when not coming from uniformed officers, such questions usually reflect the endearing Bengali characteristic of curiosity rather than hostility, so I engage with him. He proceeds to tell me: "My uncle lives in Krishnanagar. We are originally from o paar. My brother now works there." He asks if I have been there; I have not, but he has, many times. "I go every year for Eid. This year I will take my children for the first time." I ask him if it is difficult to get a visa. He laughs. "What visa?! People like you need visas, we just go whenever we feel like it, no-one can stop us." He caustically points out, "Your border guards demand more money than ours to cross. You Indians are thieves."
The problem when discussing migration from Bangladesh to India starts with the disconnect between the two countries on the very existence of the issue, let alone the scale. Indian officials have gone on record quoting figures as high as 20 million Bangladeshi immigrants. Their Bangladeshi counterparts stick to the official position dating from General Zia's era -- that there is not a single Bangladeshi migrant in India. The respective national media usually echo the official positions.
In both countries, the subject of migration eventually touches some extremely raw nerves that hit at the heart of the national psyche. The modern state of India was founded on the principle of a pluralistic secular democracy defined by a vision rather than demographics; the land that Nazrul described as Udar Bharat, opening its arms to all mankind; the country comprising, as Tagore celebrated in his Bharat Tirtha, of a sea of humanity from all over the world that, once in India, would never leave. However, even among those who swear by this vision for India are those who are increasingly vocal in their discomfort with the growing Muslim population in eastern India, which many believe is driven by immigration from Bangladesh. They point to statistics from the census: West Bengal's Muslim population has risen to 25% in 2001 from 21% in 1971; corresponding figures for Assam are 31% in 2001 and 25% in 1971.
There is an eerie hypocrisy at work here; if such idealistic visionaries are silent about other undocumented migrants in India -- including an estimated 10 million from Nepal, as well as those from Tibet and Sri Lanka -- why is it that the presence of Bangladeshi Muslims in particular raises such cries of protest? And why are Hindu Bangladeshis universally seen as refugees, while Muslims are seen only as illegal migrants and a potential security risk. Most shockingly, what message does this framework -- that a disproportionate rise in the Muslim population is bad -- sendto native Muslim populations in West Bengal and Assam, not to mention Muslims from other regions of the country?
In Bangladesh, there is a similar discomfort when confronting the issue of migration to India. The existence of a Bangladeshi diaspora, both legal and "illegal," is acknowledged and even celebrated in most cases; past Bangladeshi prime ministers have publicly voiced support for legalising undocumented migrants in countries such as US, Malaysia and Brunei, for instance, taking up the matter with their counterparts at an official level. However, given both the tumultuous history of East Bengal post-1947, and the current relationship dynamics between India and Bangladesh at a national level, to accept that Bangladeshis would willingly choose to migrate to "Big Brother" India for a better life is perhaps difficult for many to accept.
India, of course, has its own diaspora of economic migrants (with twice as many Indians having "illegal" status in the US compared to Bangladeshis, for instance) as well as a population of 400 million below the poverty line (i.e., more than double the entire population of Bangladesh itself), but such metrics, which put India "in its place," do not seem to provide comfort to those seemingly worried about bruised national pride in acknowledging the situation. Particularly when prominent Indian politicians make statements such as: "Migration is a means for Bangladesh to outsource its poverty and squalor."
Some Bangladeshis accept that there may be migration, but are concerned both by the scale suggested by India, and by the reaction. There may be a legitimate fear that the moment Bangladesh accepts the existence of illegal migration to India, there would be legal sanction for India to take draconian measures in response. The phenomenon of "push back" (deporting identified illegal immigrants back to Bangladesh -- known as "push in" in Bangladesh) is one example, and such practices in larger numbers than the occasional occurrences at present would certainly be horrific from a humanitarian point of view, even with legal sanction.
Bangladeshis should be reassured, however, that the harassment of supposed Bangladeshi migrants in India has not gone unchallenged. There is a vocal lobby that systematically protests the brazen declarations calling for mass deportation, challenging both the identification of alleged Bangladeshis, and the human rights behind the means and methods. Mamata Banerjee, leader of the Trinamool Congress, famously declared in the Indian Parliament, following the most aggressive drive by the Maharashtra government to identify and deport illegal Bangladeshi immigrants in 1998: "Even if somebody is a Bangladeshi, he should not be treated like cats and dogs, as we have traditional ties, ethnic and common culture with Bangladesh … So, a message should go to the people that nobody should be harassed like this and the people should not be tortured like this."
Indians must confront several demons in their national psychewhen considering the issue of Bangladeshi migration. The unpleasant truth is that many of those who have come to India have, in effect, already been legalised; by the Indian border guards who took payment from either the migrants themselves or the dalals responsible for bringing them over. Not to mention by the Indian politicians of all political parties who have granted ration cards to migrants in return for their becoming loyal voters. Many of these migrants have been in the country for several decades, and have had children born in India. Doesn't questioning their status and seeking their deportation violate a fundamental principle of human rights -- that rights once granted cannot be withdrawn? And just as the US has a steady stream of undocumented migration from its southern border with poorer Mexico, as long as trade imbalances and economic disparity exist with Bangladesh, no matter what laws are in place, migration is likely to continue. As India increasingly seeks to present itself as an emerging superpower, it must pay closer attention to the message that its means and methods in dealing with this situation sends to the global community.
As far as Bangladesh is concerned, there should be recognition that refusing to discuss or acknowledge the situation is a growing irritant in bilateral relations, ranking alongside trade, the environment, and terrorism. There are other sensitive issues for Bangladesh to consider as well; the continued existence and implementation of the Enemy/Vested Property Act is itself responsible, perhaps, for a significant portion of the migration of Hindu Bangladeshis to India since 1971. Flashpoints, like the riots of 1992 or the post-election violence of 2001, trigger noticeable spikes in the flow of Hindus crossing over into India, and this is an area where Bangladesh must confront demons of its own. Official denial of migration to India in general also raises the dangers faced by Bangladeshis in India and increases the likelihood of their being abused.
Much of the domestic labour in Calcutta is now Bangladeshi, and consists primarily of women and children. Living in constant fear of detection and deportation they are liable to be underpaid, and have little recourse to complain if working conditions are unfair or even inhuman. The implications are greater for the hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshi men who work in India's factories, and increasingly on construction sites throughout cities such as Calcutta, Delhi, Mumbai and Bangalore, where they are invariably the workers with least physical protection and no likely compensation in the event of accidents. With Bangladesh in denial mode, India increasingly hostile, and employers with no incentive to seek anything other than the highest profit margins, this largely poor population is a pawn in larger power games.
Udayan Chattopadhyay is a Forum contributor.
Udayan Chattopadhyay reflects on the border divide
An accident of history placed my mother's ancestral village right next to the border, though on the "right" side as far as we were concerned. No one from our immediate family lives there anymore, and I had never visited it; on a whim, during one of my annual trips to India, we decide to drive out there mainly to see the famous mandir which our family has been involved with over several generations, and which is a major place of local pilgrimage.
We can see the border very clearly from the temple roof. A disciplined line (by Bengali standards) waits on both sides, with papers in hand, eager to cross to the other side. Indian and Bangladeshi officers -- distinguishable by their different uniforms -- are busy processing documents, opening bags, conducting body searches, and then waving people through to their counterparts on the other side. Within clear visibility, though a distance away, is another portion of this border; here, there is utter chaos on both sides -- crowds of people, trucks, cows, goats, bullock-carts -- and the movement is more fluid and erratic; officers from either the Indian or Bangladeshi side are nowhere to be seen. "That line isn't for people like us," one of the temple staff assures me as he notices my fascination. "There they just come and go as they please, they don't need papers like we do."
As we go around the temple, the purohit explains that during the big festivals the bulk of the visitors are, in fact, from Bangladesh. During Durga Puja, they construct huge tents outside the premises; Indian visitors are primarily local or day-trippers, but Bangladeshis usually stop overnight on their way to Calcutta and beyond.
"Are they Hindus only?" I ask. "No, both Hindus and Muslims. They all come to enjoy the festivities, though only the Hindus worship." Apparently, thousands pass through every year from o paar. "We cook special meals for the Bangladeshis -- they prefer food different from what we usually eat." "Halal?" I ask, though that seems ridiculous; the temple would never serve meat. "No" he laughs. "Those Bangals, they prefer their food to be much more jhal than we do. We will die if we eat that food all the time!" "Do the visitors from Bangladesh stop at the temple on their way back?" Everyone laughs at my naïve question. "No one goes back once they come over e paar."
They explain that it is much easier to cross during religious festivals, when border guards can be more readily convinced that the travelers are undertaking quick family visits.
At the market right outside the temple I notice that many of the publications -- mainly religious books -- are from Dhaka and Khulna rather than from Calcutta. "They are cheaper than the ones from Calcutta," explains the hawker as I fumble through the pages, more interested in how the books got to India than in the contents. A rival hawker, who perhaps does not have access to the cheaper merchandise, asserts harshly: "Those Bangladeshi books are terrible. They will fall apart within a couple of days. My books are more expensive but they are Indian and better." I chuckle with my family at what seems to be harmless banter -- until the seller of Calcutta books rebukes his neighbour: "You Bangals, you are ruining our country. Why don't you just go back to where you came from?" And he's not joking.
This exchange sends shivers down my spine. Having grown up in London as an Indian immigrant, battling bullies in the school playground, and having lived in New York through the post 9/11 hysteria, hearing "go back to where you came from" -- in any language, in any geography -- momentarily paralyses me. I do not know whether he is one of the Bangals whose family, like those of an estimated 25% of West Bengal's population (20 million people), crossed over from o paar in the decade after 1947. Or is he part of a later phenomenon -- the post-1971 Bangladeshi migrant, estimated by many in India to be between 5 and 20 million. And if the latter, is he an economic migrant (both Hindu and Muslim) or a refugee (invariably Hindu)? I have spent hours debating with my Bangladeshi friends the very existence of the phenomenon of Bangladeshi migration to India, and the nuances behind these categories, but seeing the hurt on the "Bangladeshi" man's face, I don't really care for labels at this point. This is obviously not the first time he has heard this kind of talk. It is a reminder of the rising passions across India on the issue of Bangladeshi migrants.
When in Dhaka a few months later, I find myself thinking about the same issues. A rickshaw puller identifies my accent and starts grilling me: "Are you from Calcutta? What are you doing in Dhaka?
Are you Muslim?" I have come to realise that, when not coming from uniformed officers, such questions usually reflect the endearing Bengali characteristic of curiosity rather than hostility, so I engage with him. He proceeds to tell me: "My uncle lives in Krishnanagar. We are originally from o paar. My brother now works there." He asks if I have been there; I have not, but he has, many times. "I go every year for Eid. This year I will take my children for the first time." I ask him if it is difficult to get a visa. He laughs. "What visa?! People like you need visas, we just go whenever we feel like it, no-one can stop us." He caustically points out, "Your border guards demand more money than ours to cross. You Indians are thieves."
The problem when discussing migration from Bangladesh to India starts with the disconnect between the two countries on the very existence of the issue, let alone the scale. Indian officials have gone on record quoting figures as high as 20 million Bangladeshi immigrants. Their Bangladeshi counterparts stick to the official position dating from General Zia's era -- that there is not a single Bangladeshi migrant in India. The respective national media usually echo the official positions.
In both countries, the subject of migration eventually touches some extremely raw nerves that hit at the heart of the national psyche. The modern state of India was founded on the principle of a pluralistic secular democracy defined by a vision rather than demographics; the land that Nazrul described as Udar Bharat, opening its arms to all mankind; the country comprising, as Tagore celebrated in his Bharat Tirtha, of a sea of humanity from all over the world that, once in India, would never leave. However, even among those who swear by this vision for India are those who are increasingly vocal in their discomfort with the growing Muslim population in eastern India, which many believe is driven by immigration from Bangladesh. They point to statistics from the census: West Bengal's Muslim population has risen to 25% in 2001 from 21% in 1971; corresponding figures for Assam are 31% in 2001 and 25% in 1971.
There is an eerie hypocrisy at work here; if such idealistic visionaries are silent about other undocumented migrants in India -- including an estimated 10 million from Nepal, as well as those from Tibet and Sri Lanka -- why is it that the presence of Bangladeshi Muslims in particular raises such cries of protest? And why are Hindu Bangladeshis universally seen as refugees, while Muslims are seen only as illegal migrants and a potential security risk. Most shockingly, what message does this framework -- that a disproportionate rise in the Muslim population is bad -- sendto native Muslim populations in West Bengal and Assam, not to mention Muslims from other regions of the country?
In Bangladesh, there is a similar discomfort when confronting the issue of migration to India. The existence of a Bangladeshi diaspora, both legal and "illegal," is acknowledged and even celebrated in most cases; past Bangladeshi prime ministers have publicly voiced support for legalising undocumented migrants in countries such as US, Malaysia and Brunei, for instance, taking up the matter with their counterparts at an official level. However, given both the tumultuous history of East Bengal post-1947, and the current relationship dynamics between India and Bangladesh at a national level, to accept that Bangladeshis would willingly choose to migrate to "Big Brother" India for a better life is perhaps difficult for many to accept.
India, of course, has its own diaspora of economic migrants (with twice as many Indians having "illegal" status in the US compared to Bangladeshis, for instance) as well as a population of 400 million below the poverty line (i.e., more than double the entire population of Bangladesh itself), but such metrics, which put India "in its place," do not seem to provide comfort to those seemingly worried about bruised national pride in acknowledging the situation. Particularly when prominent Indian politicians make statements such as: "Migration is a means for Bangladesh to outsource its poverty and squalor."
Some Bangladeshis accept that there may be migration, but are concerned both by the scale suggested by India, and by the reaction. There may be a legitimate fear that the moment Bangladesh accepts the existence of illegal migration to India, there would be legal sanction for India to take draconian measures in response. The phenomenon of "push back" (deporting identified illegal immigrants back to Bangladesh -- known as "push in" in Bangladesh) is one example, and such practices in larger numbers than the occasional occurrences at present would certainly be horrific from a humanitarian point of view, even with legal sanction.
Bangladeshis should be reassured, however, that the harassment of supposed Bangladeshi migrants in India has not gone unchallenged. There is a vocal lobby that systematically protests the brazen declarations calling for mass deportation, challenging both the identification of alleged Bangladeshis, and the human rights behind the means and methods. Mamata Banerjee, leader of the Trinamool Congress, famously declared in the Indian Parliament, following the most aggressive drive by the Maharashtra government to identify and deport illegal Bangladeshi immigrants in 1998: "Even if somebody is a Bangladeshi, he should not be treated like cats and dogs, as we have traditional ties, ethnic and common culture with Bangladesh … So, a message should go to the people that nobody should be harassed like this and the people should not be tortured like this."
Indians must confront several demons in their national psychewhen considering the issue of Bangladeshi migration. The unpleasant truth is that many of those who have come to India have, in effect, already been legalised; by the Indian border guards who took payment from either the migrants themselves or the dalals responsible for bringing them over. Not to mention by the Indian politicians of all political parties who have granted ration cards to migrants in return for their becoming loyal voters. Many of these migrants have been in the country for several decades, and have had children born in India. Doesn't questioning their status and seeking their deportation violate a fundamental principle of human rights -- that rights once granted cannot be withdrawn? And just as the US has a steady stream of undocumented migration from its southern border with poorer Mexico, as long as trade imbalances and economic disparity exist with Bangladesh, no matter what laws are in place, migration is likely to continue. As India increasingly seeks to present itself as an emerging superpower, it must pay closer attention to the message that its means and methods in dealing with this situation sends to the global community.
As far as Bangladesh is concerned, there should be recognition that refusing to discuss or acknowledge the situation is a growing irritant in bilateral relations, ranking alongside trade, the environment, and terrorism. There are other sensitive issues for Bangladesh to consider as well; the continued existence and implementation of the Enemy/Vested Property Act is itself responsible, perhaps, for a significant portion of the migration of Hindu Bangladeshis to India since 1971. Flashpoints, like the riots of 1992 or the post-election violence of 2001, trigger noticeable spikes in the flow of Hindus crossing over into India, and this is an area where Bangladesh must confront demons of its own. Official denial of migration to India in general also raises the dangers faced by Bangladeshis in India and increases the likelihood of their being abused.
Much of the domestic labour in Calcutta is now Bangladeshi, and consists primarily of women and children. Living in constant fear of detection and deportation they are liable to be underpaid, and have little recourse to complain if working conditions are unfair or even inhuman. The implications are greater for the hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshi men who work in India's factories, and increasingly on construction sites throughout cities such as Calcutta, Delhi, Mumbai and Bangalore, where they are invariably the workers with least physical protection and no likely compensation in the event of accidents. With Bangladesh in denial mode, India increasingly hostile, and employers with no incentive to seek anything other than the highest profit margins, this largely poor population is a pawn in larger power games.
Udayan Chattopadhyay is a Forum contributor.
Sunday, July 22, 2007
Amarnath pilgrim embraces Islam
Srinagar : An Amarnath pilgrim from Haryana came to the fold of Islam at Sonamarg hill resort in Ganderbal district of Jammu and Kashmir on Friday. He is said to have undergone this change of heart following his disenchantment from his previous faith caused by the melting of the Shiv Lingam at the Amarnath cave shrine.The melting of the Shiv Lingam for the past few years at the Amarnath cave shrine has been an agonizing event for most of the devotees, who make the arduous trek to the shrine. The ice lingam at the Amarnath caves used to remain frozen for months in the previous years but extreme changes in climatic conditions have made it impossible for the phenomenon to continue.Parveen Sharma arrived at Baltal base camp enroute to Amarnath, 100 kms from Srinagar, and straightway drove to nearby Sonamarg hill resort where he expressed his desire to embrace Islam at the local Jama Masjid during Friday prayers, reports said citing official sources here. They said he was administered 'kalimah' (faith) by the local imam who also gave him the Muslim name Sheikh Iqbal. Later, he was taken around in the main market in a procession and garlanded. This is for the first time that any Hindu devotee, who had come to pay obeisance at the 3,880 metre high holy cave shrine of Amarnath in south Kashmir Himalayas, has embraced Islam.
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