JONAI, AXOM ,Feb 17 – With political parties gearing up for the forthcoming Assembly election in the Axom, the Hindutva brigrade Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) began its rally from Jonai here recently.Axom BJP president Indramani Bora urged the citizens to oust the Congress government in the ensuing polls. Criticising the Tarun Gogoi-led Congress government, he stated that the law and order situation in the State has deteriorated so much that the security of the common people cannot be ensured. Congress has failed to take step to ameliorate the sufferings of the people in the State, he alleged.Stating that the ouster of Congress rule to check the overwhelming corruption and exploitation is the need of the hour the BJP president castigated the State government for being inactive, idle and inefficient. Addressing the gathering in the occasion Narayan Borkatoky, a senior BJP leader asserted that the Congress rule is more terrible than the British rule.Participating in the inaugural programme of rally former Union Minister and general secretary of BJP central committee, Fanatic Hindutva Pramod Mahajan alleged that the ruling Congress government has been playing ‘divide and rule’ politics to demolish the unity among the ethnic groups of Assam. He claimed that there was no alternative other than the BJP to restore unity among the people irrespective of caste and creed. Explaining the concept of ‘Hindustani’ the BJP leader elaborated that the Congress’s anti-people politics had led to enhance Bangladeshi immigration into the State. He said that the Congress rule is a misfortune for the people of Assam. Vehemently criticising Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi, Mahajan said that the most tainted history of the State was created during the Congress regime when suspected Bangladeshi nationals have infiltrated into almost all the district. He also expressed concern over the alarming increase in Muslim voters in the electoral rolls especially since 1971 during the Congress tenures. ‘The forthcoming election is not an ordinary one but a struggle to protect our motherland from the grip of Bangladeshi nationals’, he stressed.
As the fathfull servent of the northindian fanatic hindutva Mr I Bora , have said that over here law and order situation have deterioted but does not he see about the Fanatic ruled state whats going their .
Mr P Mahajan have said that there are many bangladeshis in Axom / Northeast - but why muslim , there are not even a single muslim over in Axom who are illegale but about hindus from bangladesh , nepal and north india it is a questionable .
Saturday, February 18, 2006
What Bush Is Up To
by Charley Reese
I'm going to tell you what the real Bush administration policy is. I have no take-it-to-court proof. No one does, because the administration doesn't tell the truth and is very secretive.
But from conversations I've had with people from the Middle East and from extensive reading, I infer that the Bush administration's policy encompasses three goals:
One of the goals is to replace the present Syrian government with one the administration hopes will be more pliable in its policy toward Israel. Another is to construct four permanent bases in Iraq, and that means the administration has no intention of ever withdrawing all U.S. forces. The third goal is to attack Iran's nuclear facilities from the air. The propaganda campaign to justify this attack is already under way.
The U.S. government has lied a lot about Syria. It has implied that Syria was helping jihadists slip into Iraq. Some of the neoconservatives have claimed that Iraq hid its infamous nonexistent weapons of mass destruction in Syria. Now they have joined in accusing the Syrian government of assassinating a Lebanese politician. They've even picked out a successor to the current president of Syria. More recently, they accused Syria of inciting mobs to burn a foreign embassy in Damascus during a riot related to the prophet cartoons.
In fact, Syria's government is Ba'athist – that is to say, it is secular, socialist and nationalistic. It highly disapproves of religious extremists, whether Shi'ites or Sunni. There is no evidence whatsoever that Syria incited the mobs to burn the foreign embassy in Damascus. Professor Juan Cole searched the databases of Arab newspapers and radio broadcasts, which are monitored and translated by the U.S. government and the BBC. Not a peep from the Syrian government in the way of incitement.
The Syrian ambassador to the U.S. told me of another instance of U.S. lying. Our government asked the Syrian government to help it catch an Iraqi who was hiding in a tribal area that extended across the border, partly in Iraq and partly in Syria. The Syrian government agreed and indeed captured the man and 32 of his followers, all of whom were handed over to the U.S. Syria asked the U.S. for only one thing in return: just tell the world we cooperated with you.
Did the U.S. do that? No, it lied and said that the Syrians had harbored the fugitive. As for Saddam Hussein hiding his weapons in Syria, it so happens that the Syrian Ba'ath Party and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party have famously been at odds for years. People spreading that nonsense seem to have forgotten that Syrian troops fought alongside Americans in Gulf War I against Iraq. You can be sure Saddam did not forget that. He would have no more turned over his nonexistent weapons to Syria than he would have to Israel.
The large American military bases in Iraq already exist and are being improved. These are billion-dollar-plus facilities, and you can bet nobody in the Bush administration intends to hand them over to the Iraqis. Watch carefully the language used when the Bush people, in or out of uniform, talk about "withdrawal." It is always surrounded by conditions. They don't intend to leave Iraq. Now, that doesn't mean that the new Iraqi government might not force them to leave. That remains to be seen.
As for bombing Iran's nuclear facilities, we have that capability. There's not much the Iranians could do to stop us. And, yes, it would be a stupid and foolish thing to do, since at present there is no evidence that Iran intends to build a bomb. As we know from the Iraq invasion, this administration is capable of doing stupid and foolish things.
Just because Iran can't stop us from bombing it doesn't mean the Iranians can't retaliate. They very likely have the capability of setting the entire Middle East on fire with a general war that could disrupt the world's oil supply and wreck much of the world's economy. Unfortunately, history shows that those who bet on wise political leadership avoiding war end up losing their shirts and often their lives and their fortunes.
I'm going to tell you what the real Bush administration policy is. I have no take-it-to-court proof. No one does, because the administration doesn't tell the truth and is very secretive.
But from conversations I've had with people from the Middle East and from extensive reading, I infer that the Bush administration's policy encompasses three goals:
One of the goals is to replace the present Syrian government with one the administration hopes will be more pliable in its policy toward Israel. Another is to construct four permanent bases in Iraq, and that means the administration has no intention of ever withdrawing all U.S. forces. The third goal is to attack Iran's nuclear facilities from the air. The propaganda campaign to justify this attack is already under way.
The U.S. government has lied a lot about Syria. It has implied that Syria was helping jihadists slip into Iraq. Some of the neoconservatives have claimed that Iraq hid its infamous nonexistent weapons of mass destruction in Syria. Now they have joined in accusing the Syrian government of assassinating a Lebanese politician. They've even picked out a successor to the current president of Syria. More recently, they accused Syria of inciting mobs to burn a foreign embassy in Damascus during a riot related to the prophet cartoons.
In fact, Syria's government is Ba'athist – that is to say, it is secular, socialist and nationalistic. It highly disapproves of religious extremists, whether Shi'ites or Sunni. There is no evidence whatsoever that Syria incited the mobs to burn the foreign embassy in Damascus. Professor Juan Cole searched the databases of Arab newspapers and radio broadcasts, which are monitored and translated by the U.S. government and the BBC. Not a peep from the Syrian government in the way of incitement.
The Syrian ambassador to the U.S. told me of another instance of U.S. lying. Our government asked the Syrian government to help it catch an Iraqi who was hiding in a tribal area that extended across the border, partly in Iraq and partly in Syria. The Syrian government agreed and indeed captured the man and 32 of his followers, all of whom were handed over to the U.S. Syria asked the U.S. for only one thing in return: just tell the world we cooperated with you.
Did the U.S. do that? No, it lied and said that the Syrians had harbored the fugitive. As for Saddam Hussein hiding his weapons in Syria, it so happens that the Syrian Ba'ath Party and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party have famously been at odds for years. People spreading that nonsense seem to have forgotten that Syrian troops fought alongside Americans in Gulf War I against Iraq. You can be sure Saddam did not forget that. He would have no more turned over his nonexistent weapons to Syria than he would have to Israel.
The large American military bases in Iraq already exist and are being improved. These are billion-dollar-plus facilities, and you can bet nobody in the Bush administration intends to hand them over to the Iraqis. Watch carefully the language used when the Bush people, in or out of uniform, talk about "withdrawal." It is always surrounded by conditions. They don't intend to leave Iraq. Now, that doesn't mean that the new Iraqi government might not force them to leave. That remains to be seen.
As for bombing Iran's nuclear facilities, we have that capability. There's not much the Iranians could do to stop us. And, yes, it would be a stupid and foolish thing to do, since at present there is no evidence that Iran intends to build a bomb. As we know from the Iraq invasion, this administration is capable of doing stupid and foolish things.
Just because Iran can't stop us from bombing it doesn't mean the Iranians can't retaliate. They very likely have the capability of setting the entire Middle East on fire with a general war that could disrupt the world's oil supply and wreck much of the world's economy. Unfortunately, history shows that those who bet on wise political leadership avoiding war end up losing their shirts and often their lives and their fortunes.
Report: Sunni Insurgents Increasingly Unified in Iraq
by Jim Lobe
WASHINGTON – Despite reports of growing tensions and even occasional clashes between Islamists and nationalists, the predominantly Sunni insurgency in Iraq appears increasingly united and confident of victory, according to a new report released here Wednesday by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG).
The 30-page report, based primarily on an analysis of the public communications of insurgent groups, as well as interviews and past studies about the insurgency, also concludes that rebel groups have adapted quickly and effectively to changing U.S. tactics – in both the military and political spheres.
"Over time, the insurgency appears to have become more coordinated, confident, sensitive to its constituents' demands, and adept at learning from the enemy's successes and its own failures," according to the report, "In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency."
"The U.S. must take these factors into account if it is to understand the insurgency's resilience and learn how to counter it," it added, stressing that the most effective responses include reining in and disbanding sectarian militias responsible for human rights abuses and repeatedly making clear that Washington has no designs on Iraq's oil resources or on its territory for military bases.
The report, which comes amid intense – but so far unavailing – efforts by the U.S. embassy to negotiate the creation of a new government in Baghdad that will place prominent Sunnis in key cabinet posts, is based mainly on what insurgents have themselves said on their Internet Web sites and chat rooms, videos, tapes, and leaflets since the invasion and how those messages have evolved.
While much of the rhetoric is propagandistic, according to the ICG, it also provides a "window into the insurgency" capable of informing the analyst about its internal debates, levels of coordination, its perceptions of both the enemy and its constituency, and changes in tactics and strategy.
Such a textual analysis, according to the ICG, yields conclusions that are substantially at odds with many of Washington's current, as well as past, assumptions about the insurgency. Indeed, "[I]n Iraq, the U.S. fights an enemy it hardly knows," the report asserts.
The notion, for example, that the insurgency is divided between Iraqi nationalists and foreign jihadis, most prominently al-Qaeda's Organization in Mesopotamia (QOM) allegedly led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, appears increasingly questionable, according to the report, which notes that there has been a "gradual convergence" in the groups' tactics and rhetoric.
"A year ago, groups appeared divided over practices and ideology, but most debates have been settled through convergence around Sunni Islamic jurisprudence and Sunni Arab grievances," according to the report.
"Practically speaking, it has become virtually impossible to categorize a particular group's discourse as jihadi as opposed to nationalist or patriotic, with the exception of the Ba'ath Party, whose presence on the ground has been singularly ineffective."
During the first half of 2005, when reports of armed clashes between the two kinds of groups first surfaced, that was less true, but, since then and despite intense U.S. efforts to drive a wedge between them, the groups have largely harmonized their rhetoric.
In that connection, "recent reports of negotiations between 'nationalist' groups and the U.S. over forming an alliance against foreign jihadis appear at the very least exaggerated," according to the report. It noted that any such "duplicity" would almost certainly have been exposed and denounced by others.
Moreover, "no armed group so far has even hinted" that it may be willing to negotiate with the U.S. and Iraqi authorities. "While covert talks cannot be excluded, the publicly accessible discourse remains uniformly and relentlessly hostile to the occupation and its 'collaborators.'"
That does not mean that differences between the two kinds of groups do not exist and that there could be a day of reckoning – but only after Washington's withdrawal. "To this day, the armed opposition's avowed objectives have … been reduced to a primary goal: ridding Iraq of the foreign occupier. Beyond that, all is vague."
Meanwhile, the groups have become increasingly mindful of their image and the necessity of cultivating public opinion among Sunnis, other Iraqis, and the West, according to the report.
Thus, they promptly and systematically respond to charges that they are corrupt or target innocent civilians and even reject accusations, despite the evidence from suicide attacks, against Shi'ite mosques, that they are waging a sectarian campaign.
Similarly, they have abandoned some tactics that proved especially revolting to their various audiences, such as the beheading of hostages and attacking voters going to the polls. And "[w]hile [they] deny any intent of depriving the population of water and electricity, restraint does not apply to oil installations, which are seen as part and parcel of American designs to exploit Iraq."
According to the report, four main groups now dominate the communications channels of the insurgency and publish regularly through a variety of media: QOM; Partisans of the Sunna Army (Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna); the Islamic Army in Iraq (al-Jaysh al-Islami fil-'Iraq); and the Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance (al-Jabha al-Islamiya lil-Muqawama al-'Iraqiya, or Jami).
QOM, whose operational importance has, according to the ICG, been exaggerated by U.S. officials, sought during the past year to "Iraqify" its image, in part by reportedly replacing Zarqawi, a Jordanian, with an Iraqi leader. Jami, according to some ICG sources, may be a "public relations organ" shared by different armed groups and tends to be somewhat more sophisticated and nationalistic in its rhetoric and communications strategy than the others.
Another five groups that take credit for military actions generally use far less elaborate and stable channels of communication, while four more groups appear to lack regular means of communication to produce occasional claims of responsibility for armed actions through statements or videos.
All groups appear to have become more confident over the past year, according to the report, which noted that their optimism is not only noticeable in their official communiqués but in more spontaneous expressions by militants and sympathizers on Internet chat sites and elsewhere.
Initially, according to the report, they perceived the U.S. presence as extremely difficult to remove, "[b]ut that no longer is the case."
"Today, the prospect of an outright victory and a swift withdrawal of foreign forces has crystallized, bolstered by the U.S.' perceived loss of legitimacy and apparent vacillation, its periodic announcement of troops redeployments, the precipitous decline in domestic support for the war, and heightened calls by prominent politicians for a rapid withdrawal," the report states.
Moreover, "[w]hen the U.S. leaves, the insurgents do not doubt that Iraq's security forces and institutions would quickly collapse."
WASHINGTON – Despite reports of growing tensions and even occasional clashes between Islamists and nationalists, the predominantly Sunni insurgency in Iraq appears increasingly united and confident of victory, according to a new report released here Wednesday by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG).
The 30-page report, based primarily on an analysis of the public communications of insurgent groups, as well as interviews and past studies about the insurgency, also concludes that rebel groups have adapted quickly and effectively to changing U.S. tactics – in both the military and political spheres.
"Over time, the insurgency appears to have become more coordinated, confident, sensitive to its constituents' demands, and adept at learning from the enemy's successes and its own failures," according to the report, "In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency."
"The U.S. must take these factors into account if it is to understand the insurgency's resilience and learn how to counter it," it added, stressing that the most effective responses include reining in and disbanding sectarian militias responsible for human rights abuses and repeatedly making clear that Washington has no designs on Iraq's oil resources or on its territory for military bases.
The report, which comes amid intense – but so far unavailing – efforts by the U.S. embassy to negotiate the creation of a new government in Baghdad that will place prominent Sunnis in key cabinet posts, is based mainly on what insurgents have themselves said on their Internet Web sites and chat rooms, videos, tapes, and leaflets since the invasion and how those messages have evolved.
While much of the rhetoric is propagandistic, according to the ICG, it also provides a "window into the insurgency" capable of informing the analyst about its internal debates, levels of coordination, its perceptions of both the enemy and its constituency, and changes in tactics and strategy.
Such a textual analysis, according to the ICG, yields conclusions that are substantially at odds with many of Washington's current, as well as past, assumptions about the insurgency. Indeed, "[I]n Iraq, the U.S. fights an enemy it hardly knows," the report asserts.
The notion, for example, that the insurgency is divided between Iraqi nationalists and foreign jihadis, most prominently al-Qaeda's Organization in Mesopotamia (QOM) allegedly led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, appears increasingly questionable, according to the report, which notes that there has been a "gradual convergence" in the groups' tactics and rhetoric.
"A year ago, groups appeared divided over practices and ideology, but most debates have been settled through convergence around Sunni Islamic jurisprudence and Sunni Arab grievances," according to the report.
"Practically speaking, it has become virtually impossible to categorize a particular group's discourse as jihadi as opposed to nationalist or patriotic, with the exception of the Ba'ath Party, whose presence on the ground has been singularly ineffective."
During the first half of 2005, when reports of armed clashes between the two kinds of groups first surfaced, that was less true, but, since then and despite intense U.S. efforts to drive a wedge between them, the groups have largely harmonized their rhetoric.
In that connection, "recent reports of negotiations between 'nationalist' groups and the U.S. over forming an alliance against foreign jihadis appear at the very least exaggerated," according to the report. It noted that any such "duplicity" would almost certainly have been exposed and denounced by others.
Moreover, "no armed group so far has even hinted" that it may be willing to negotiate with the U.S. and Iraqi authorities. "While covert talks cannot be excluded, the publicly accessible discourse remains uniformly and relentlessly hostile to the occupation and its 'collaborators.'"
That does not mean that differences between the two kinds of groups do not exist and that there could be a day of reckoning – but only after Washington's withdrawal. "To this day, the armed opposition's avowed objectives have … been reduced to a primary goal: ridding Iraq of the foreign occupier. Beyond that, all is vague."
Meanwhile, the groups have become increasingly mindful of their image and the necessity of cultivating public opinion among Sunnis, other Iraqis, and the West, according to the report.
Thus, they promptly and systematically respond to charges that they are corrupt or target innocent civilians and even reject accusations, despite the evidence from suicide attacks, against Shi'ite mosques, that they are waging a sectarian campaign.
Similarly, they have abandoned some tactics that proved especially revolting to their various audiences, such as the beheading of hostages and attacking voters going to the polls. And "[w]hile [they] deny any intent of depriving the population of water and electricity, restraint does not apply to oil installations, which are seen as part and parcel of American designs to exploit Iraq."
According to the report, four main groups now dominate the communications channels of the insurgency and publish regularly through a variety of media: QOM; Partisans of the Sunna Army (Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna); the Islamic Army in Iraq (al-Jaysh al-Islami fil-'Iraq); and the Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance (al-Jabha al-Islamiya lil-Muqawama al-'Iraqiya, or Jami).
QOM, whose operational importance has, according to the ICG, been exaggerated by U.S. officials, sought during the past year to "Iraqify" its image, in part by reportedly replacing Zarqawi, a Jordanian, with an Iraqi leader. Jami, according to some ICG sources, may be a "public relations organ" shared by different armed groups and tends to be somewhat more sophisticated and nationalistic in its rhetoric and communications strategy than the others.
Another five groups that take credit for military actions generally use far less elaborate and stable channels of communication, while four more groups appear to lack regular means of communication to produce occasional claims of responsibility for armed actions through statements or videos.
All groups appear to have become more confident over the past year, according to the report, which noted that their optimism is not only noticeable in their official communiqués but in more spontaneous expressions by militants and sympathizers on Internet chat sites and elsewhere.
Initially, according to the report, they perceived the U.S. presence as extremely difficult to remove, "[b]ut that no longer is the case."
"Today, the prospect of an outright victory and a swift withdrawal of foreign forces has crystallized, bolstered by the U.S.' perceived loss of legitimacy and apparent vacillation, its periodic announcement of troops redeployments, the precipitous decline in domestic support for the war, and heightened calls by prominent politicians for a rapid withdrawal," the report states.
Moreover, "[w]hen the U.S. leaves, the insurgents do not doubt that Iraq's security forces and institutions would quickly collapse."
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)