Wednesday, July 30, 2008
Samujjal Bhattacharya on July 09 have declare a war against the Muslims of Assam.
Samujjal Bhattacharya with his Anti Muslim organization AASU have declared vigorous and continuous agitation in Assam. The cause is too much of Muslims have given sleepless nights to him and his folk. Brahmin S Bhattacharya said that seven persons have being released from jail, this persons were arrested on the presumption of ISI agents. But the authority in Assam could not proof it and have released them. He along with his folk Sankar Prasad Rai and Tapan Kumar Gogoi have said that the war will start with the sound and instruments. The scenario reminds of the hindu fanatic pogrom of Gujarat 02. One should know that Brahmin have entered Assam / N.E. during the last 400 years. So Brahmin S Bhattacharya should know that – What right do he have to talk on behalf of indigenous communities ??? Sankar Prasad Rai is from the Rajbonshi community – which it self does not have a long history in Assam / N.E. The Ahoms who came to Assam were part of Shan tribes from which the word Assam has come. They were not influenced by the Brahmin religion before they came to Assam but sometime after the 14th century the Ahom Kings came under increasing Brahmin religious influence and like this the Brahmin conjured up a new kashatriya lineage for them. And in this way Ahom became followers of Brahmin religion and in modern time ended up with the lower stage of the Brahmin caste system. Though majority of the Ahoms follow the Brahmin religion but still they follow their Tai culture and tradition. So, it will be better for Brahmin S Bhattacharya and his illegal anti Muslim organization AASU to take some lesson from history and not to full the masses of Assam / N.E.
Thursday, August 09, 2007
EPAAR OPAAR
http://thedailystar.net/forum/2007/august/epaar.htm
Udayan Chattopadhyay reflects on the border divide
An accident of history placed my mother's ancestral village right next to the border, though on the "right" side as far as we were concerned. No one from our immediate family lives there anymore, and I had never visited it; on a whim, during one of my annual trips to India, we decide to drive out there mainly to see the famous mandir which our family has been involved with over several generations, and which is a major place of local pilgrimage.
We can see the border very clearly from the temple roof. A disciplined line (by Bengali standards) waits on both sides, with papers in hand, eager to cross to the other side. Indian and Bangladeshi officers -- distinguishable by their different uniforms -- are busy processing documents, opening bags, conducting body searches, and then waving people through to their counterparts on the other side. Within clear visibility, though a distance away, is another portion of this border; here, there is utter chaos on both sides -- crowds of people, trucks, cows, goats, bullock-carts -- and the movement is more fluid and erratic; officers from either the Indian or Bangladeshi side are nowhere to be seen. "That line isn't for people like us," one of the temple staff assures me as he notices my fascination. "There they just come and go as they please, they don't need papers like we do."
As we go around the temple, the purohit explains that during the big festivals the bulk of the visitors are, in fact, from Bangladesh. During Durga Puja, they construct huge tents outside the premises; Indian visitors are primarily local or day-trippers, but Bangladeshis usually stop overnight on their way to Calcutta and beyond.
"Are they Hindus only?" I ask. "No, both Hindus and Muslims. They all come to enjoy the festivities, though only the Hindus worship." Apparently, thousands pass through every year from o paar. "We cook special meals for the Bangladeshis -- they prefer food different from what we usually eat." "Halal?" I ask, though that seems ridiculous; the temple would never serve meat. "No" he laughs. "Those Bangals, they prefer their food to be much more jhal than we do. We will die if we eat that food all the time!" "Do the visitors from Bangladesh stop at the temple on their way back?" Everyone laughs at my naïve question. "No one goes back once they come over e paar."
They explain that it is much easier to cross during religious festivals, when border guards can be more readily convinced that the travelers are undertaking quick family visits.
At the market right outside the temple I notice that many of the publications -- mainly religious books -- are from Dhaka and Khulna rather than from Calcutta. "They are cheaper than the ones from Calcutta," explains the hawker as I fumble through the pages, more interested in how the books got to India than in the contents. A rival hawker, who perhaps does not have access to the cheaper merchandise, asserts harshly: "Those Bangladeshi books are terrible. They will fall apart within a couple of days. My books are more expensive but they are Indian and better." I chuckle with my family at what seems to be harmless banter -- until the seller of Calcutta books rebukes his neighbour: "You Bangals, you are ruining our country. Why don't you just go back to where you came from?" And he's not joking.
This exchange sends shivers down my spine. Having grown up in London as an Indian immigrant, battling bullies in the school playground, and having lived in New York through the post 9/11 hysteria, hearing "go back to where you came from" -- in any language, in any geography -- momentarily paralyses me. I do not know whether he is one of the Bangals whose family, like those of an estimated 25% of West Bengal's population (20 million people), crossed over from o paar in the decade after 1947. Or is he part of a later phenomenon -- the post-1971 Bangladeshi migrant, estimated by many in India to be between 5 and 20 million. And if the latter, is he an economic migrant (both Hindu and Muslim) or a refugee (invariably Hindu)? I have spent hours debating with my Bangladeshi friends the very existence of the phenomenon of Bangladeshi migration to India, and the nuances behind these categories, but seeing the hurt on the "Bangladeshi" man's face, I don't really care for labels at this point. This is obviously not the first time he has heard this kind of talk. It is a reminder of the rising passions across India on the issue of Bangladeshi migrants.
When in Dhaka a few months later, I find myself thinking about the same issues. A rickshaw puller identifies my accent and starts grilling me: "Are you from Calcutta? What are you doing in Dhaka?
Are you Muslim?" I have come to realise that, when not coming from uniformed officers, such questions usually reflect the endearing Bengali characteristic of curiosity rather than hostility, so I engage with him. He proceeds to tell me: "My uncle lives in Krishnanagar. We are originally from o paar. My brother now works there." He asks if I have been there; I have not, but he has, many times. "I go every year for Eid. This year I will take my children for the first time." I ask him if it is difficult to get a visa. He laughs. "What visa?! People like you need visas, we just go whenever we feel like it, no-one can stop us." He caustically points out, "Your border guards demand more money than ours to cross. You Indians are thieves."
The problem when discussing migration from Bangladesh to India starts with the disconnect between the two countries on the very existence of the issue, let alone the scale. Indian officials have gone on record quoting figures as high as 20 million Bangladeshi immigrants. Their Bangladeshi counterparts stick to the official position dating from General Zia's era -- that there is not a single Bangladeshi migrant in India. The respective national media usually echo the official positions.
In both countries, the subject of migration eventually touches some extremely raw nerves that hit at the heart of the national psyche. The modern state of India was founded on the principle of a pluralistic secular democracy defined by a vision rather than demographics; the land that Nazrul described as Udar Bharat, opening its arms to all mankind; the country comprising, as Tagore celebrated in his Bharat Tirtha, of a sea of humanity from all over the world that, once in India, would never leave. However, even among those who swear by this vision for India are those who are increasingly vocal in their discomfort with the growing Muslim population in eastern India, which many believe is driven by immigration from Bangladesh. They point to statistics from the census: West Bengal's Muslim population has risen to 25% in 2001 from 21% in 1971; corresponding figures for Assam are 31% in 2001 and 25% in 1971.
There is an eerie hypocrisy at work here; if such idealistic visionaries are silent about other undocumented migrants in India -- including an estimated 10 million from Nepal, as well as those from Tibet and Sri Lanka -- why is it that the presence of Bangladeshi Muslims in particular raises such cries of protest? And why are Hindu Bangladeshis universally seen as refugees, while Muslims are seen only as illegal migrants and a potential security risk. Most shockingly, what message does this framework -- that a disproportionate rise in the Muslim population is bad -- sendto native Muslim populations in West Bengal and Assam, not to mention Muslims from other regions of the country?
In Bangladesh, there is a similar discomfort when confronting the issue of migration to India. The existence of a Bangladeshi diaspora, both legal and "illegal," is acknowledged and even celebrated in most cases; past Bangladeshi prime ministers have publicly voiced support for legalising undocumented migrants in countries such as US, Malaysia and Brunei, for instance, taking up the matter with their counterparts at an official level. However, given both the tumultuous history of East Bengal post-1947, and the current relationship dynamics between India and Bangladesh at a national level, to accept that Bangladeshis would willingly choose to migrate to "Big Brother" India for a better life is perhaps difficult for many to accept.
India, of course, has its own diaspora of economic migrants (with twice as many Indians having "illegal" status in the US compared to Bangladeshis, for instance) as well as a population of 400 million below the poverty line (i.e., more than double the entire population of Bangladesh itself), but such metrics, which put India "in its place," do not seem to provide comfort to those seemingly worried about bruised national pride in acknowledging the situation. Particularly when prominent Indian politicians make statements such as: "Migration is a means for Bangladesh to outsource its poverty and squalor."
Some Bangladeshis accept that there may be migration, but are concerned both by the scale suggested by India, and by the reaction. There may be a legitimate fear that the moment Bangladesh accepts the existence of illegal migration to India, there would be legal sanction for India to take draconian measures in response. The phenomenon of "push back" (deporting identified illegal immigrants back to Bangladesh -- known as "push in" in Bangladesh) is one example, and such practices in larger numbers than the occasional occurrences at present would certainly be horrific from a humanitarian point of view, even with legal sanction.
Bangladeshis should be reassured, however, that the harassment of supposed Bangladeshi migrants in India has not gone unchallenged. There is a vocal lobby that systematically protests the brazen declarations calling for mass deportation, challenging both the identification of alleged Bangladeshis, and the human rights behind the means and methods. Mamata Banerjee, leader of the Trinamool Congress, famously declared in the Indian Parliament, following the most aggressive drive by the Maharashtra government to identify and deport illegal Bangladeshi immigrants in 1998: "Even if somebody is a Bangladeshi, he should not be treated like cats and dogs, as we have traditional ties, ethnic and common culture with Bangladesh … So, a message should go to the people that nobody should be harassed like this and the people should not be tortured like this."
Indians must confront several demons in their national psychewhen considering the issue of Bangladeshi migration. The unpleasant truth is that many of those who have come to India have, in effect, already been legalised; by the Indian border guards who took payment from either the migrants themselves or the dalals responsible for bringing them over. Not to mention by the Indian politicians of all political parties who have granted ration cards to migrants in return for their becoming loyal voters. Many of these migrants have been in the country for several decades, and have had children born in India. Doesn't questioning their status and seeking their deportation violate a fundamental principle of human rights -- that rights once granted cannot be withdrawn? And just as the US has a steady stream of undocumented migration from its southern border with poorer Mexico, as long as trade imbalances and economic disparity exist with Bangladesh, no matter what laws are in place, migration is likely to continue. As India increasingly seeks to present itself as an emerging superpower, it must pay closer attention to the message that its means and methods in dealing with this situation sends to the global community.
As far as Bangladesh is concerned, there should be recognition that refusing to discuss or acknowledge the situation is a growing irritant in bilateral relations, ranking alongside trade, the environment, and terrorism. There are other sensitive issues for Bangladesh to consider as well; the continued existence and implementation of the Enemy/Vested Property Act is itself responsible, perhaps, for a significant portion of the migration of Hindu Bangladeshis to India since 1971. Flashpoints, like the riots of 1992 or the post-election violence of 2001, trigger noticeable spikes in the flow of Hindus crossing over into India, and this is an area where Bangladesh must confront demons of its own. Official denial of migration to India in general also raises the dangers faced by Bangladeshis in India and increases the likelihood of their being abused.
Much of the domestic labour in Calcutta is now Bangladeshi, and consists primarily of women and children. Living in constant fear of detection and deportation they are liable to be underpaid, and have little recourse to complain if working conditions are unfair or even inhuman. The implications are greater for the hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshi men who work in India's factories, and increasingly on construction sites throughout cities such as Calcutta, Delhi, Mumbai and Bangalore, where they are invariably the workers with least physical protection and no likely compensation in the event of accidents. With Bangladesh in denial mode, India increasingly hostile, and employers with no incentive to seek anything other than the highest profit margins, this largely poor population is a pawn in larger power games.
Udayan Chattopadhyay is a Forum contributor.
Udayan Chattopadhyay reflects on the border divide
An accident of history placed my mother's ancestral village right next to the border, though on the "right" side as far as we were concerned. No one from our immediate family lives there anymore, and I had never visited it; on a whim, during one of my annual trips to India, we decide to drive out there mainly to see the famous mandir which our family has been involved with over several generations, and which is a major place of local pilgrimage.
We can see the border very clearly from the temple roof. A disciplined line (by Bengali standards) waits on both sides, with papers in hand, eager to cross to the other side. Indian and Bangladeshi officers -- distinguishable by their different uniforms -- are busy processing documents, opening bags, conducting body searches, and then waving people through to their counterparts on the other side. Within clear visibility, though a distance away, is another portion of this border; here, there is utter chaos on both sides -- crowds of people, trucks, cows, goats, bullock-carts -- and the movement is more fluid and erratic; officers from either the Indian or Bangladeshi side are nowhere to be seen. "That line isn't for people like us," one of the temple staff assures me as he notices my fascination. "There they just come and go as they please, they don't need papers like we do."
As we go around the temple, the purohit explains that during the big festivals the bulk of the visitors are, in fact, from Bangladesh. During Durga Puja, they construct huge tents outside the premises; Indian visitors are primarily local or day-trippers, but Bangladeshis usually stop overnight on their way to Calcutta and beyond.
"Are they Hindus only?" I ask. "No, both Hindus and Muslims. They all come to enjoy the festivities, though only the Hindus worship." Apparently, thousands pass through every year from o paar. "We cook special meals for the Bangladeshis -- they prefer food different from what we usually eat." "Halal?" I ask, though that seems ridiculous; the temple would never serve meat. "No" he laughs. "Those Bangals, they prefer their food to be much more jhal than we do. We will die if we eat that food all the time!" "Do the visitors from Bangladesh stop at the temple on their way back?" Everyone laughs at my naïve question. "No one goes back once they come over e paar."
They explain that it is much easier to cross during religious festivals, when border guards can be more readily convinced that the travelers are undertaking quick family visits.
At the market right outside the temple I notice that many of the publications -- mainly religious books -- are from Dhaka and Khulna rather than from Calcutta. "They are cheaper than the ones from Calcutta," explains the hawker as I fumble through the pages, more interested in how the books got to India than in the contents. A rival hawker, who perhaps does not have access to the cheaper merchandise, asserts harshly: "Those Bangladeshi books are terrible. They will fall apart within a couple of days. My books are more expensive but they are Indian and better." I chuckle with my family at what seems to be harmless banter -- until the seller of Calcutta books rebukes his neighbour: "You Bangals, you are ruining our country. Why don't you just go back to where you came from?" And he's not joking.
This exchange sends shivers down my spine. Having grown up in London as an Indian immigrant, battling bullies in the school playground, and having lived in New York through the post 9/11 hysteria, hearing "go back to where you came from" -- in any language, in any geography -- momentarily paralyses me. I do not know whether he is one of the Bangals whose family, like those of an estimated 25% of West Bengal's population (20 million people), crossed over from o paar in the decade after 1947. Or is he part of a later phenomenon -- the post-1971 Bangladeshi migrant, estimated by many in India to be between 5 and 20 million. And if the latter, is he an economic migrant (both Hindu and Muslim) or a refugee (invariably Hindu)? I have spent hours debating with my Bangladeshi friends the very existence of the phenomenon of Bangladeshi migration to India, and the nuances behind these categories, but seeing the hurt on the "Bangladeshi" man's face, I don't really care for labels at this point. This is obviously not the first time he has heard this kind of talk. It is a reminder of the rising passions across India on the issue of Bangladeshi migrants.
When in Dhaka a few months later, I find myself thinking about the same issues. A rickshaw puller identifies my accent and starts grilling me: "Are you from Calcutta? What are you doing in Dhaka?
Are you Muslim?" I have come to realise that, when not coming from uniformed officers, such questions usually reflect the endearing Bengali characteristic of curiosity rather than hostility, so I engage with him. He proceeds to tell me: "My uncle lives in Krishnanagar. We are originally from o paar. My brother now works there." He asks if I have been there; I have not, but he has, many times. "I go every year for Eid. This year I will take my children for the first time." I ask him if it is difficult to get a visa. He laughs. "What visa?! People like you need visas, we just go whenever we feel like it, no-one can stop us." He caustically points out, "Your border guards demand more money than ours to cross. You Indians are thieves."
The problem when discussing migration from Bangladesh to India starts with the disconnect between the two countries on the very existence of the issue, let alone the scale. Indian officials have gone on record quoting figures as high as 20 million Bangladeshi immigrants. Their Bangladeshi counterparts stick to the official position dating from General Zia's era -- that there is not a single Bangladeshi migrant in India. The respective national media usually echo the official positions.
In both countries, the subject of migration eventually touches some extremely raw nerves that hit at the heart of the national psyche. The modern state of India was founded on the principle of a pluralistic secular democracy defined by a vision rather than demographics; the land that Nazrul described as Udar Bharat, opening its arms to all mankind; the country comprising, as Tagore celebrated in his Bharat Tirtha, of a sea of humanity from all over the world that, once in India, would never leave. However, even among those who swear by this vision for India are those who are increasingly vocal in their discomfort with the growing Muslim population in eastern India, which many believe is driven by immigration from Bangladesh. They point to statistics from the census: West Bengal's Muslim population has risen to 25% in 2001 from 21% in 1971; corresponding figures for Assam are 31% in 2001 and 25% in 1971.
There is an eerie hypocrisy at work here; if such idealistic visionaries are silent about other undocumented migrants in India -- including an estimated 10 million from Nepal, as well as those from Tibet and Sri Lanka -- why is it that the presence of Bangladeshi Muslims in particular raises such cries of protest? And why are Hindu Bangladeshis universally seen as refugees, while Muslims are seen only as illegal migrants and a potential security risk. Most shockingly, what message does this framework -- that a disproportionate rise in the Muslim population is bad -- sendto native Muslim populations in West Bengal and Assam, not to mention Muslims from other regions of the country?
In Bangladesh, there is a similar discomfort when confronting the issue of migration to India. The existence of a Bangladeshi diaspora, both legal and "illegal," is acknowledged and even celebrated in most cases; past Bangladeshi prime ministers have publicly voiced support for legalising undocumented migrants in countries such as US, Malaysia and Brunei, for instance, taking up the matter with their counterparts at an official level. However, given both the tumultuous history of East Bengal post-1947, and the current relationship dynamics between India and Bangladesh at a national level, to accept that Bangladeshis would willingly choose to migrate to "Big Brother" India for a better life is perhaps difficult for many to accept.
India, of course, has its own diaspora of economic migrants (with twice as many Indians having "illegal" status in the US compared to Bangladeshis, for instance) as well as a population of 400 million below the poverty line (i.e., more than double the entire population of Bangladesh itself), but such metrics, which put India "in its place," do not seem to provide comfort to those seemingly worried about bruised national pride in acknowledging the situation. Particularly when prominent Indian politicians make statements such as: "Migration is a means for Bangladesh to outsource its poverty and squalor."
Some Bangladeshis accept that there may be migration, but are concerned both by the scale suggested by India, and by the reaction. There may be a legitimate fear that the moment Bangladesh accepts the existence of illegal migration to India, there would be legal sanction for India to take draconian measures in response. The phenomenon of "push back" (deporting identified illegal immigrants back to Bangladesh -- known as "push in" in Bangladesh) is one example, and such practices in larger numbers than the occasional occurrences at present would certainly be horrific from a humanitarian point of view, even with legal sanction.
Bangladeshis should be reassured, however, that the harassment of supposed Bangladeshi migrants in India has not gone unchallenged. There is a vocal lobby that systematically protests the brazen declarations calling for mass deportation, challenging both the identification of alleged Bangladeshis, and the human rights behind the means and methods. Mamata Banerjee, leader of the Trinamool Congress, famously declared in the Indian Parliament, following the most aggressive drive by the Maharashtra government to identify and deport illegal Bangladeshi immigrants in 1998: "Even if somebody is a Bangladeshi, he should not be treated like cats and dogs, as we have traditional ties, ethnic and common culture with Bangladesh … So, a message should go to the people that nobody should be harassed like this and the people should not be tortured like this."
Indians must confront several demons in their national psychewhen considering the issue of Bangladeshi migration. The unpleasant truth is that many of those who have come to India have, in effect, already been legalised; by the Indian border guards who took payment from either the migrants themselves or the dalals responsible for bringing them over. Not to mention by the Indian politicians of all political parties who have granted ration cards to migrants in return for their becoming loyal voters. Many of these migrants have been in the country for several decades, and have had children born in India. Doesn't questioning their status and seeking their deportation violate a fundamental principle of human rights -- that rights once granted cannot be withdrawn? And just as the US has a steady stream of undocumented migration from its southern border with poorer Mexico, as long as trade imbalances and economic disparity exist with Bangladesh, no matter what laws are in place, migration is likely to continue. As India increasingly seeks to present itself as an emerging superpower, it must pay closer attention to the message that its means and methods in dealing with this situation sends to the global community.
As far as Bangladesh is concerned, there should be recognition that refusing to discuss or acknowledge the situation is a growing irritant in bilateral relations, ranking alongside trade, the environment, and terrorism. There are other sensitive issues for Bangladesh to consider as well; the continued existence and implementation of the Enemy/Vested Property Act is itself responsible, perhaps, for a significant portion of the migration of Hindu Bangladeshis to India since 1971. Flashpoints, like the riots of 1992 or the post-election violence of 2001, trigger noticeable spikes in the flow of Hindus crossing over into India, and this is an area where Bangladesh must confront demons of its own. Official denial of migration to India in general also raises the dangers faced by Bangladeshis in India and increases the likelihood of their being abused.
Much of the domestic labour in Calcutta is now Bangladeshi, and consists primarily of women and children. Living in constant fear of detection and deportation they are liable to be underpaid, and have little recourse to complain if working conditions are unfair or even inhuman. The implications are greater for the hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshi men who work in India's factories, and increasingly on construction sites throughout cities such as Calcutta, Delhi, Mumbai and Bangalore, where they are invariably the workers with least physical protection and no likely compensation in the event of accidents. With Bangladesh in denial mode, India increasingly hostile, and employers with no incentive to seek anything other than the highest profit margins, this largely poor population is a pawn in larger power games.
Udayan Chattopadhyay is a Forum contributor.
Sunday, July 22, 2007
Amarnath pilgrim embraces Islam
Srinagar : An Amarnath pilgrim from Haryana came to the fold of Islam at Sonamarg hill resort in Ganderbal district of Jammu and Kashmir on Friday. He is said to have undergone this change of heart following his disenchantment from his previous faith caused by the melting of the Shiv Lingam at the Amarnath cave shrine.The melting of the Shiv Lingam for the past few years at the Amarnath cave shrine has been an agonizing event for most of the devotees, who make the arduous trek to the shrine. The ice lingam at the Amarnath caves used to remain frozen for months in the previous years but extreme changes in climatic conditions have made it impossible for the phenomenon to continue.Parveen Sharma arrived at Baltal base camp enroute to Amarnath, 100 kms from Srinagar, and straightway drove to nearby Sonamarg hill resort where he expressed his desire to embrace Islam at the local Jama Masjid during Friday prayers, reports said citing official sources here. They said he was administered 'kalimah' (faith) by the local imam who also gave him the Muslim name Sheikh Iqbal. Later, he was taken around in the main market in a procession and garlanded. This is for the first time that any Hindu devotee, who had come to pay obeisance at the 3,880 metre high holy cave shrine of Amarnath in south Kashmir Himalayas, has embraced Islam.
Thursday, December 28, 2006
The Iraq Study Group Report — Has the Empire Really Failed?
The Iraq Study Group Report — Has the Empire Really Failed?
Publication time: 27 December 2006, 12:07
"The Failure of Empire" is the title I gave to the closing chapter of my book Naked Imperialism (Monthly Review Press, 2006). That chapter first appeared almost two years ago as a January 2005 article in Monthly Review. It began: "The United States is facing the prospect of a major defeat in Iraq that is likely to constitute a serious setback in the ongoing campaign to expand the U.S. empire." It ended: "The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq may be creating the conditions for a civil war, lighting a powder keg under the entire Middle East."
These observations have been borne out by subsequent events. Yet, at a time when even the new Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, has stated that the United States is "not winning" the war in Iraq, it is important to recognize that there is also a sense in which the empire may not have entirely failed — at least not yet. The war is almost universally viewed as a political and military disaster for the U.S. empire. Nevertheless, Washington is still hoping amidst the devastation to hold on to some of its long-term economic and strategic goals in Iraq. Realization of these will have made the war "worth it" from the standpoint of the U.S. ruling class, irrespective of the cost in lives and treasure.
There is no doubt what these spoils are: (1) control of Iraqi oil reserves (the second largest in the world), (2) "geopolitical gains" (or greater domination of the vital Middle East oil region), and (3) strengthening of U.S. global hegemony as a result of this new oil imperium. Crucial to the realization of these spoils, the United States has not only been forcibly occupying Iraq, but has also been looking to the future by building long-term (usually referred to as "permanent") military bases in Iraq where it plans to continue to locate substantial military forces and capabilities even after it has ostensibly "withdrawn" its troops. Such bases have but one undisguised purpose: the projection of U.S. imperial power over Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and the surrounding regions as part of the larger global projection of U.S power.
Little noticed or commented on in media discussions of the recently released Iraq Study Group Report is that one of its proposed "Milestones" for "the end of 2006-early 2007" is the Iraqi government's passage of a "new petroleum law." Washington not only helped to draft this law (in conjunction with representatives of the large oil corporations), but is playing a role in ensuring its passage. The full details of the new legislation are not available, but it is clear that it is intended to establish "production-sharing agreements." Production-sharing agreements are the contemporary version of the old imperial concessions system, giving foreign corporations control over the production and marketing of Iraqi oil reserves and the lion's share of the profits.
In line with this, the Iraq Study Group Report's Recommendation 63 states: (1) "The United States should encourage investment in Iraq's oil sector by the international community and by international energy companies," and (2) "The United States should assist Iraqi leaders to reorganize the national oil industry as a commercial enterprise, in order to enhance efficiency, transparency, and accountability." In other words, the goal is the privatization of the Iraqi oil industry to an extent that does not currently exist for any major petroleum-exporting country. This will open up the country's oil fields to full exploitation by foreign corporations (in which U.S. and British oil multinationals are expected to dominate). The new production sharing agreements will so enhance the value of the global energy firms that enter into these contracts that these corporations will be able to book the value of the Iraqi oil production/reserves that they control, as assets in their own corporate accounts (see "Notes from the Editors," Monthly Review, December 2006).
Given the antiwar movement's earlier "No Blood for Oil" slogan, the U.S. political and economic establishment and the U.S. corporate media have of course done everything they can to conceal and downplay the significance of oil in the Iraq equation. This can be seen in a front page article in the New York Times on December 9th entitled "Iraqis Near Deal on Distribution of Oil Revenues," addressing the new Iraqi oil law. The article focuses entirely on the issue of the distribution of oil revenues between Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis, a crucial issue in the formation of a new Iraqi state. But something is missing. Nowhere in its extensive and detailed analysis does the New York Times mention that in the new law the Iraqi oil industry is to be effectively privatized, with real control over the oil reserves turned over largely to foreign corporations through production-sharing agreements that no major oil exporter has accepted willingly.
To be sure, Recommendation 23 of the Iraq Study Group Report would appear to have helped alleviate all such concerns by declaring that "The President should restate that the United States does not seek to control Iraq's oil." But the fact that the President Bush is asked to "restate" this suggests that his original statement to this effect was not believed by the Iraqis, and for good reason. Although the United States has offered "guarantees" of Iraq's de jure control over its own oil, the production-sharing agreements in the draft petroleum law are designed to wrest from it de facto control.
The non-treatment of this issue by the New York Times contrasts sharply with the analysis only two days before in London's Financial Times (December 7, 2006) in an article entitled "Oil Groups Dream of Day They Can Enter Iraq." There we are told: "Political squabbles have overshadowed what could be the historic aspect of the legislation: . . . the law is expected finally to reverse the 1972 nationalization of the industry. According to drafts now circulating, it would allow various forms of foreign partnership, possibly including production-sharing agreements. Such contracts are preferred by oil companies . . . giving them greater scope for gain if oil prices rise." Further, the Financial Times states: "Big oil multinationals struggling to increase their own production and add to reserves have been desperate to be given a chance to develop Iraq's oilfields." One British Petroleum official is quoted as saying, "The whole industry is interested in Iraq, including us." "From a global perspective," the Financial Times tells its mostly corporate readers, "Iraq's oil is becoming increasingly important to overall supply as demand accelerates, from China in particular, and output from fields in the U.S., Europe and parts of Asia slows with their advancing age." Iraq's production, the Financial Times contends, needs to increase by 4.9 percent every year until 2030 to meet world demand.
The main obstacle to this "Oil Groups Dream" is of course lack of security, which greatly magnifies risks. Iraq needs to be under firm, strategic military control. This means that it must be ruled over by either a strong but exceedingly compliant state or by an imperial force (or more likely some combination of the two). Only in this way can the decades-long production-sharing agreements and the vast potential profits to be derived from them be secured. As the same BP official states, "The security situation would have to improve dramatically if oil companies like us were to commit themselves to long-term exploration and development." This boils down to finding a way of making sure that the Iraqi oil fields remain within the U.S. empire.
It is from this vantage point, in which Iraqi oil looms ever larger, that we can understand the main features of the Iraq Study Group Report, the most comprehensive plan yet available for ending the war in Iraq while securing U.S. power over the country. Contrary to the initial media accounts, this report by the bipartisan foreign policy "realists" (James Baker III, Lee Hamilton, and their co-authors) is not simply about how the United States can exit from Iraq. Rather it seeks to do so while retaining the spoils seized in the war. Maintaining control over Iraq thus still takes precedence over complete withdrawal. The empire it seems has not yet admitted failure and while wounded is still seeking to dictate the terms.
The Iraq Study Group actually envisions a "surge" of U.S. troops in Iraq in the immediate future to accelerate the formation of a strong Iraqi army and to stabilize Baghdad. Thus their report states that "the United States should significantly increase the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units."
Indeed, the bipartisan "realists" envision something more like a partial withdrawal and redeployment of U.S. forces than a complete withdrawal from Iraq. Here it is important to recognize that despite the report's insistence that "all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq" by early 2008, this is understood as still leaving a large role for U.S. troops: in the areas of "force protection," as "units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising . . . and search and rescue" . . . as well as intelligence and other support operations — all of which are included in the Iraq Study Group Report recommendations. Indeed, the plan offered by the Iraq Study Group would involve multiplying by as much as five times the number of U.S. troops embedded in Iraqi forces for an indefinite period.
Further, we are told that "a vital mission of the U.S. military would be to maintain indefinitely rapid-reaction teams and special operations teams. These teams would be available to undertake strike missions against al Qaeda in Iraq when the opportunity arises, as well as for other missions considered vital by the U.S. commander in Iraq." The U.S. would also continue to train the Iraq police forces, while moving the "police commandos" of the national police (paramilitary death squads originally promoted by the United States — see "Notes from the Editors," Monthly Review, May 2006) into the Iraqi Army, where the United States would have greater control over their counterinsurgency operations
In case there should be a misunderstanding about the continuing U.S. military role in Iraq, the report explicitly states: "Even after the United States has moved all combat brigades out of Iraq we would maintain a considerable military presence in the region, with our still significant force in Iraq and with our powerful air, ground, and naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, as well as an increased presence in Afghanistan" (italics added). These forces would be available to support the Iraqi government, block the disintegration of the country, fight terrorism, train equip and support the Iraqi troops, and deter foreign aggression. In short, they would be available for all conceivable military missions necessary to control Iraq and to limit its "sovereignty" to that of a subservient neo-colony.
The Iraq Study Group's widely noted Recommendation 22 underscores that "the President should state that the United States does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq." But the next sentence in that recommendation undermines the first by declaring: "If the Iraq government were to request a temporary base or bases, then the U.S. government could consider that request as it would in the case of any other government." Such "temporary" bases can obviously be of very long duration.
The most ominous statement in the Iraq Study Group Report relates to the dismemberment of the country. The United States, the report says, should not support political "devolution to three regions" and thus the weakening, as critics suggest, of a strong Arab oil state. Nevertheless: "If events were to move irreversibly in this direction, the United States should manage the situation to . . . minimize regional instability. The United States should support as much as possible central control by government authorities in Baghdad, particularly on the question of oil revenues." Although this might be read as U.S. support for stability in Iraq and for fair distribution of oil, it is more credible to understand it as a statement of the need to maintain the empire of oil, above all other ends: including the continuation of Iraq as viable a nation-state, and the prevention of its dismemberment.
All of this points to the fact that the U.S. empire has not entirely failed in Iraq, at least not yet. From the standpoint of powerful vested interests in the United States, the Iraq War may still be seen as worth the costs. Oil after all is more valuable than blood, especially the blood of others (including the innocent). Iraq may be a political disaster but it remains an economic and geopolitical prize of incalculable dimensions. As a result the empire is not yet letting go. We remain in an age of Naked Imperialism.
Source: ZmagOrg
Publication time: 27 December 2006, 12:07
"The Failure of Empire" is the title I gave to the closing chapter of my book Naked Imperialism (Monthly Review Press, 2006). That chapter first appeared almost two years ago as a January 2005 article in Monthly Review. It began: "The United States is facing the prospect of a major defeat in Iraq that is likely to constitute a serious setback in the ongoing campaign to expand the U.S. empire." It ended: "The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq may be creating the conditions for a civil war, lighting a powder keg under the entire Middle East."
These observations have been borne out by subsequent events. Yet, at a time when even the new Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, has stated that the United States is "not winning" the war in Iraq, it is important to recognize that there is also a sense in which the empire may not have entirely failed — at least not yet. The war is almost universally viewed as a political and military disaster for the U.S. empire. Nevertheless, Washington is still hoping amidst the devastation to hold on to some of its long-term economic and strategic goals in Iraq. Realization of these will have made the war "worth it" from the standpoint of the U.S. ruling class, irrespective of the cost in lives and treasure.
There is no doubt what these spoils are: (1) control of Iraqi oil reserves (the second largest in the world), (2) "geopolitical gains" (or greater domination of the vital Middle East oil region), and (3) strengthening of U.S. global hegemony as a result of this new oil imperium. Crucial to the realization of these spoils, the United States has not only been forcibly occupying Iraq, but has also been looking to the future by building long-term (usually referred to as "permanent") military bases in Iraq where it plans to continue to locate substantial military forces and capabilities even after it has ostensibly "withdrawn" its troops. Such bases have but one undisguised purpose: the projection of U.S. imperial power over Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and the surrounding regions as part of the larger global projection of U.S power.
Little noticed or commented on in media discussions of the recently released Iraq Study Group Report is that one of its proposed "Milestones" for "the end of 2006-early 2007" is the Iraqi government's passage of a "new petroleum law." Washington not only helped to draft this law (in conjunction with representatives of the large oil corporations), but is playing a role in ensuring its passage. The full details of the new legislation are not available, but it is clear that it is intended to establish "production-sharing agreements." Production-sharing agreements are the contemporary version of the old imperial concessions system, giving foreign corporations control over the production and marketing of Iraqi oil reserves and the lion's share of the profits.
In line with this, the Iraq Study Group Report's Recommendation 63 states: (1) "The United States should encourage investment in Iraq's oil sector by the international community and by international energy companies," and (2) "The United States should assist Iraqi leaders to reorganize the national oil industry as a commercial enterprise, in order to enhance efficiency, transparency, and accountability." In other words, the goal is the privatization of the Iraqi oil industry to an extent that does not currently exist for any major petroleum-exporting country. This will open up the country's oil fields to full exploitation by foreign corporations (in which U.S. and British oil multinationals are expected to dominate). The new production sharing agreements will so enhance the value of the global energy firms that enter into these contracts that these corporations will be able to book the value of the Iraqi oil production/reserves that they control, as assets in their own corporate accounts (see "Notes from the Editors," Monthly Review, December 2006).
Given the antiwar movement's earlier "No Blood for Oil" slogan, the U.S. political and economic establishment and the U.S. corporate media have of course done everything they can to conceal and downplay the significance of oil in the Iraq equation. This can be seen in a front page article in the New York Times on December 9th entitled "Iraqis Near Deal on Distribution of Oil Revenues," addressing the new Iraqi oil law. The article focuses entirely on the issue of the distribution of oil revenues between Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis, a crucial issue in the formation of a new Iraqi state. But something is missing. Nowhere in its extensive and detailed analysis does the New York Times mention that in the new law the Iraqi oil industry is to be effectively privatized, with real control over the oil reserves turned over largely to foreign corporations through production-sharing agreements that no major oil exporter has accepted willingly.
To be sure, Recommendation 23 of the Iraq Study Group Report would appear to have helped alleviate all such concerns by declaring that "The President should restate that the United States does not seek to control Iraq's oil." But the fact that the President Bush is asked to "restate" this suggests that his original statement to this effect was not believed by the Iraqis, and for good reason. Although the United States has offered "guarantees" of Iraq's de jure control over its own oil, the production-sharing agreements in the draft petroleum law are designed to wrest from it de facto control.
The non-treatment of this issue by the New York Times contrasts sharply with the analysis only two days before in London's Financial Times (December 7, 2006) in an article entitled "Oil Groups Dream of Day They Can Enter Iraq." There we are told: "Political squabbles have overshadowed what could be the historic aspect of the legislation: . . . the law is expected finally to reverse the 1972 nationalization of the industry. According to drafts now circulating, it would allow various forms of foreign partnership, possibly including production-sharing agreements. Such contracts are preferred by oil companies . . . giving them greater scope for gain if oil prices rise." Further, the Financial Times states: "Big oil multinationals struggling to increase their own production and add to reserves have been desperate to be given a chance to develop Iraq's oilfields." One British Petroleum official is quoted as saying, "The whole industry is interested in Iraq, including us." "From a global perspective," the Financial Times tells its mostly corporate readers, "Iraq's oil is becoming increasingly important to overall supply as demand accelerates, from China in particular, and output from fields in the U.S., Europe and parts of Asia slows with their advancing age." Iraq's production, the Financial Times contends, needs to increase by 4.9 percent every year until 2030 to meet world demand.
The main obstacle to this "Oil Groups Dream" is of course lack of security, which greatly magnifies risks. Iraq needs to be under firm, strategic military control. This means that it must be ruled over by either a strong but exceedingly compliant state or by an imperial force (or more likely some combination of the two). Only in this way can the decades-long production-sharing agreements and the vast potential profits to be derived from them be secured. As the same BP official states, "The security situation would have to improve dramatically if oil companies like us were to commit themselves to long-term exploration and development." This boils down to finding a way of making sure that the Iraqi oil fields remain within the U.S. empire.
It is from this vantage point, in which Iraqi oil looms ever larger, that we can understand the main features of the Iraq Study Group Report, the most comprehensive plan yet available for ending the war in Iraq while securing U.S. power over the country. Contrary to the initial media accounts, this report by the bipartisan foreign policy "realists" (James Baker III, Lee Hamilton, and their co-authors) is not simply about how the United States can exit from Iraq. Rather it seeks to do so while retaining the spoils seized in the war. Maintaining control over Iraq thus still takes precedence over complete withdrawal. The empire it seems has not yet admitted failure and while wounded is still seeking to dictate the terms.
The Iraq Study Group actually envisions a "surge" of U.S. troops in Iraq in the immediate future to accelerate the formation of a strong Iraqi army and to stabilize Baghdad. Thus their report states that "the United States should significantly increase the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units."
Indeed, the bipartisan "realists" envision something more like a partial withdrawal and redeployment of U.S. forces than a complete withdrawal from Iraq. Here it is important to recognize that despite the report's insistence that "all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq" by early 2008, this is understood as still leaving a large role for U.S. troops: in the areas of "force protection," as "units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising . . . and search and rescue" . . . as well as intelligence and other support operations — all of which are included in the Iraq Study Group Report recommendations. Indeed, the plan offered by the Iraq Study Group would involve multiplying by as much as five times the number of U.S. troops embedded in Iraqi forces for an indefinite period.
Further, we are told that "a vital mission of the U.S. military would be to maintain indefinitely rapid-reaction teams and special operations teams. These teams would be available to undertake strike missions against al Qaeda in Iraq when the opportunity arises, as well as for other missions considered vital by the U.S. commander in Iraq." The U.S. would also continue to train the Iraq police forces, while moving the "police commandos" of the national police (paramilitary death squads originally promoted by the United States — see "Notes from the Editors," Monthly Review, May 2006) into the Iraqi Army, where the United States would have greater control over their counterinsurgency operations
In case there should be a misunderstanding about the continuing U.S. military role in Iraq, the report explicitly states: "Even after the United States has moved all combat brigades out of Iraq we would maintain a considerable military presence in the region, with our still significant force in Iraq and with our powerful air, ground, and naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, as well as an increased presence in Afghanistan" (italics added). These forces would be available to support the Iraqi government, block the disintegration of the country, fight terrorism, train equip and support the Iraqi troops, and deter foreign aggression. In short, they would be available for all conceivable military missions necessary to control Iraq and to limit its "sovereignty" to that of a subservient neo-colony.
The Iraq Study Group's widely noted Recommendation 22 underscores that "the President should state that the United States does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq." But the next sentence in that recommendation undermines the first by declaring: "If the Iraq government were to request a temporary base or bases, then the U.S. government could consider that request as it would in the case of any other government." Such "temporary" bases can obviously be of very long duration.
The most ominous statement in the Iraq Study Group Report relates to the dismemberment of the country. The United States, the report says, should not support political "devolution to three regions" and thus the weakening, as critics suggest, of a strong Arab oil state. Nevertheless: "If events were to move irreversibly in this direction, the United States should manage the situation to . . . minimize regional instability. The United States should support as much as possible central control by government authorities in Baghdad, particularly on the question of oil revenues." Although this might be read as U.S. support for stability in Iraq and for fair distribution of oil, it is more credible to understand it as a statement of the need to maintain the empire of oil, above all other ends: including the continuation of Iraq as viable a nation-state, and the prevention of its dismemberment.
All of this points to the fact that the U.S. empire has not entirely failed in Iraq, at least not yet. From the standpoint of powerful vested interests in the United States, the Iraq War may still be seen as worth the costs. Oil after all is more valuable than blood, especially the blood of others (including the innocent). Iraq may be a political disaster but it remains an economic and geopolitical prize of incalculable dimensions. As a result the empire is not yet letting go. We remain in an age of Naked Imperialism.
Source: ZmagOrg
Hindutva Parties out of influence in Politics in Asom
The symbolic defeat of Hindutva Anti-Muslim BJP , AGP in the 2006 elections, particularly in Asom, was a good news for Muslims in the country. The Hindutva family ( BJP , AGP , AASU , AJYCP , etc ) and their supporters have been campaigning to brand the Muslims of NE as "foreigners" , who have find a section of the local print and electronic media sympathetic to their cause for a long time . .But the fact is that prior to independence of India in 1947 , Asom NE was a Muslim majority region . After the independence , Muslims were made minority in the state by transferring the Muslim majority district of Sylhet to Pakistan , and also reorganizing Asom into smaller states . During the 1962 war with China , the than Prime Minister of India Mr Nehru " was sorry for the peoples of NE "Muslims from AsomNE have been so disheartened by the ever-rising star of the BJP-AGP combine over the last decade that they can only rejoice at any relative setback that the party can befall.The RSS , BJP , AGP , AASU etc are known by different names , yet their objective is the same . They have been defaming the Muslims in Asom NE as foreigners in the same spirit and working to reduce them to an insignificant minority by deleting their names from the electoral rolls and deporting them to Bangladesh .The Supreme Court on 051206 has struck down the amendment to the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 brought in by the UPA Government early 2006 after the repeal of the IM(DT) Act, A Bench comprising Justices S B Sinha and Markandeya Katju directed the Union Government to constitutewithin four months sufficient number of tribunals to detect infiltration into Asom. The apex court had in July, 2005, struck down as "unconstitutional" the Illegal Migration (Detection by Tribunal) Act (IMDT). After quashing of the Act, the Central Government through a fresh notification in February 2006 issued the Foreigner (Tribunals for Assam) Order, 2006, which was challenged by AGP MP Sarbananda Sonowal and BJP leader Charan Deka. In the petitions, it was alleged that the notification was nothing but a repetition of the quashed IM(DT) Act which put on the onus of proving a person an illegal foreigner on the complainant. The petitioners, who were represented by senior counsel Ashok Desa! Arun Jaitley and Ravi Shankar Prasad, had submitted that if the notification was to be implemented it would be impossible to detect and deport illegal migrants.The Brahmin Propaganda RSS chief KS Sudarshan on 101206 called upon the people of the North-east to unite against imperialistic designs of the Christian church as also the Muslim fundamentalists who had set their eyes on the region to further their plans for dominance of their religions. "Both the Christian church and the Muslim fundamentalists are engaged in an aggressive pursuit of their evil designs of imperialism across the world, and the Northeast happens to be an important area of their focus due to its strategic location," Sudarshan said while addressing a Enlightened Citizens' Meet at the District Library auditorium in Guwahati. Terming the unabated infiltration from Bangladesh, increasing activities of the church aimed at spreading Christianity major problems faced by the country, Sudarshan said that only a united front from the people could defeat such evil forces. Another Brahmin Propagandist DN Bezboruah, former editor of The Sentinel, in his speech, Termin!
India as the only country where the majority is rendered second class citizens due to the unabashed minority-appeasement policy of the governments, Bezboruah said that even hard facts and data about the status of the Muslim minority (i.e. their abnormal increase in population) were sought to be brushed under the carpet for upholding the so-called secularism. Bezboruah said that the time had come for all the Hindus to unite, discarding their differences on grounds of caste. "Nowhere in the world can one witness such blatant appeasement of the minorities to the extent that the majority is in grave danger of losing their identity. The only way out of this morass is a united stand by the Hindus," he said. Another Brahmin Propagandist DN Chakravorty, editor of Dainik Asom, was of the view that the openness of the Hindu religion was being taken advantage of by outsiders, putting in jeopard! In the process the very existence of the indigenous population. "The need of the hour is to have unity, uplift and understanding among the Hindus," he said.Another Brahmin Propagandist Former State Chief Secretary JP Rajkhowa stressed the need for stern opposition to the move of some minority organisations to bring in a clone of the IM (DT) that would be applicable to the entire country following the Supreme Court's repeal of the IM (DT) and the Foreigners' (Tribunal) Order. "All political partiers and organizations of the State should evolve a common stand to thwart this sinister design," he said.Now let's see how can peoples like editors of newspapers and ex-bureaucrates attend a function attended by an organization like RSS; the group of fundamentalistsfanatics with no respect to AsomNE DIVERSITY?!!! Its ridiculous..The AASU Adviser - Brahmin S Bhattacharya along with his puppet's enjoyed a long night in the AASU head office in Guwahati, for their future agenda of anti-muslim propaganda. The same AASU leaders in their anti-muslim agitation of the early 80's of last century killed 3000 muslims on one night in a village, their the than leaders Brahmin P K Mahanta became CM of Asom, as a reward for killing the Muslims.The laws under which the Muslims were expelled from Asom are: (I) The Foreigners' Act, 1946, (II) The Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950, (III) The Foreigners' (Tribunals) Order, 1964, (IV) The prevention of Infiltration from Pakistan Plan, 1964 known as PIP Plan and (V) The Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983. Except the last one all laws are communally over toned and heavily biased against the Muslims of India. Brahmin P. K. Mahanta who was the top leader of the agitation against Muslims and CM of Asom for two terms, while commenting on the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act has, in his book, 'The tussle between the citizens and foreigners in Assam,' correctly observed: "It is not at all difficult to read the Act between the lines. It is religion oriented. The Act openly encouraged free entry into Asom of a particular religion or community on the pretext of victims of disturbances in East Pakistan. It can undoubtedly be said that this Act was largely responsible for the alarming population growth during the decades 1951 - 1961 and 961 -1971. ln secular ndia, the Hindu East Pakistanis were permitted to settle as refugees and Muslim East Pakistanis were thrown out,"Now the Muslims of Asom NE should have to acknowledge the situation - of post IMDT , its knots about the influence of Hindutva and pro-hindutva on scalping the act. The Muslims of NE should have to know about the Brahmin's policy of propagating the hate Muslims campaign on a daily basis and how to stop these hate mongers. The Muslims should have to push back these Brahmin's High caste beyond the borders of Asom NE .By Afdal Hussain ( Assam)
India as the only country where the majority is rendered second class citizens due to the unabashed minority-appeasement policy of the governments, Bezboruah said that even hard facts and data about the status of the Muslim minority (i.e. their abnormal increase in population) were sought to be brushed under the carpet for upholding the so-called secularism. Bezboruah said that the time had come for all the Hindus to unite, discarding their differences on grounds of caste. "Nowhere in the world can one witness such blatant appeasement of the minorities to the extent that the majority is in grave danger of losing their identity. The only way out of this morass is a united stand by the Hindus," he said. Another Brahmin Propagandist DN Chakravorty, editor of Dainik Asom, was of the view that the openness of the Hindu religion was being taken advantage of by outsiders, putting in jeopard! In the process the very existence of the indigenous population. "The need of the hour is to have unity, uplift and understanding among the Hindus," he said.Another Brahmin Propagandist Former State Chief Secretary JP Rajkhowa stressed the need for stern opposition to the move of some minority organisations to bring in a clone of the IM (DT) that would be applicable to the entire country following the Supreme Court's repeal of the IM (DT) and the Foreigners' (Tribunal) Order. "All political partiers and organizations of the State should evolve a common stand to thwart this sinister design," he said.Now let's see how can peoples like editors of newspapers and ex-bureaucrates attend a function attended by an organization like RSS; the group of fundamentalistsfanatics with no respect to AsomNE DIVERSITY?!!! Its ridiculous..The AASU Adviser - Brahmin S Bhattacharya along with his puppet's enjoyed a long night in the AASU head office in Guwahati, for their future agenda of anti-muslim propaganda. The same AASU leaders in their anti-muslim agitation of the early 80's of last century killed 3000 muslims on one night in a village, their the than leaders Brahmin P K Mahanta became CM of Asom, as a reward for killing the Muslims.The laws under which the Muslims were expelled from Asom are: (I) The Foreigners' Act, 1946, (II) The Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950, (III) The Foreigners' (Tribunals) Order, 1964, (IV) The prevention of Infiltration from Pakistan Plan, 1964 known as PIP Plan and (V) The Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983. Except the last one all laws are communally over toned and heavily biased against the Muslims of India. Brahmin P. K. Mahanta who was the top leader of the agitation against Muslims and CM of Asom for two terms, while commenting on the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act has, in his book, 'The tussle between the citizens and foreigners in Assam,' correctly observed: "It is not at all difficult to read the Act between the lines. It is religion oriented. The Act openly encouraged free entry into Asom of a particular religion or community on the pretext of victims of disturbances in East Pakistan. It can undoubtedly be said that this Act was largely responsible for the alarming population growth during the decades 1951 - 1961 and 961 -1971. ln secular ndia, the Hindu East Pakistanis were permitted to settle as refugees and Muslim East Pakistanis were thrown out,"Now the Muslims of Asom NE should have to acknowledge the situation - of post IMDT , its knots about the influence of Hindutva and pro-hindutva on scalping the act. The Muslims of NE should have to know about the Brahmin's policy of propagating the hate Muslims campaign on a daily basis and how to stop these hate mongers. The Muslims should have to push back these Brahmin's High caste beyond the borders of Asom NE .By Afdal Hussain ( Assam)
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